The Energy Efficiency Directive: Last but not least of EUs climate package?

Lobby strategies and coalition building among European associations

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Abstract

This study is a case study on the different European associations' advocacy efforts towards the Commission during the agenda-setting stage of the recently adopted Energy Efficiency Directive. In order to understand what facilitates interest groups access to the Commission, a model of demand and supply for information is presented. This model takes the theory of access goods as the point of departure, complimented with recent studies on interest groups supply of information to European institutions. Here, information supply is understood in terms of an interest group capacity to gather information through monitoring policy developments and producing relevant policy information. The study finds out that the Commission was largely in need of technical information and that groups from the building sector were the major providers of such information. Also, since many of the interest groups lobby strategies was recognized by a high degree of coalition building, the study seeks to explain under what conditions coalition building between European federations can occur at the EU level. This refers to a specific case of coalition building, namely the Coalition for Energy Savings. This coalition will be attempted explained through the use of process tracing by drawing on earlier literature and empirical evidence of collaboration between interest groups. The study thus takes an exploratory and theory development approach. To that end, interviews were conducted with representatives from leading European federations, including coalition staff. Finally, findings indicate that both interest groups previous collaborative behavior as well as the nature of the policy issue explains why interest groups decide to establish a coalition.

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All mistakes and inaccuracies remain my own,

Sture M. Alne

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List of Abbreviations

ACE	The Architects' Council of Europe
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
BPIE	Buildings Performance Institute Europe
Businesseurope	Confederation of European Business
BEE	Bundersverband der Erneubare Energie e.V.
BEUC	The European Consumer Organisation
CAN-E	Climate Action Network-Europe
Cecodhas	The European Liaison Committee for Social Housing
CECED	European Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturers
CEPI	Confederation of European Paper Industries
CHP	Combined Heat-Power Production
COGEN Europe	The European Association for the Promotion of Cogeneration
Commission	European Commission
CEDEC	European Federation of Local Energy Companies
DEI	Domestic Encompassing Interest
DENEFF	Deutsche Unternehmensinitiative Energieeffizienz e.V
DG	Directorate Generale
Eceee	European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
ECF	European Climate Foundation
EEB	European Environmental Bureau
EED	Energy Efficiency Directive
EEI	European Encompassing Interest
EEO	Energy Efficiency Obligations
EEIF	Energy Efficiency Industrial Forum
EPBD	Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
ENTSO-E	European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
EK	Expert Knowledge
EP	European Parliament
Eu.Bac	European Building Automation Controls Association
Eu.ESCO	European Association of Energy Service Companies
EU-ETS	EU Emissions Trading Scheme
Eurelectric	The Union of the Electricity Industry
Eurima	European Insulation Manufacturers Association
EuroACE	The European Alliance of Companies for Energy Efficiency in Buildings
Eurocoop	European Community of Consumer Cooperatives
FIEC	European Construction Industry Federation
FOEE	Friends of the Earth Europe
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
Mtoe	Million tonnes of Oil Equivalent
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
Orgalime	European Engineering Industries Association
RICS	The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
TWh	Terawatt Hour
TWCs	Tradeable White Certificates
UEAPME	European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
WWF-EPO	World Wide Fund for Nature – European Policy Office

1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

It has gone over 70 years since Harold Lasswell (1950) [1936] famously wrote that politics is about "who gets what, when and how". As this quote indicates, politics is about distribution and redistribution of goods. This coincides with the classical definition of political science as the study of the authoritative allocation of resources. In democracies, interest groups play a central role in terms of resource allocation and connecting citizens' preferences with decision makers. Since all modern societies are constructed around interest cleavages, interest groups become compelling research subjects. Grasping how such cleavages are mediated at the EU level is widely acknowledged to be central when assessing its democratic performance. Moreover, EU-interest groups relations can yield insights into comparative public policy, political economy, in addition European integration and interest groups role therein (Greenwood 2011: 5). Following the establishment of the European single market from the treaty of Maastricht, there has been an increased interest group activity to influence concomitant legislation. The numbers of interest groups and lobbyists estimated to be in Brussels varies substantially, whereas latest numbers consider the number of organizations active at the EU level to be around 3700 (Wonka et.al. 2010). However, this is not clearly distinguished from other types of organizations, but the majority of these are European associations consisting of firms, national associations and firms, NGOs (Non Governmental Organizations) or public groups (Greenwood 2011: 10 - 12). They are referred to as Euro-federations. Recent sources indicates that as much as three fifths of all these associations are pure federations (member base being only national associations), around a quarter consists of both national associations and firms, and one quarter enfold exclusively companies (Greenwood 2011: 71). Their main function is to aggregate a common interest position among their members and to communicate their policy messages to the different EU institutions. Also, Euro-federations might work in alignment to achieve common goals; either as a part of a network or through developing a formal coalition. This aspect has been paid comparatively less attention to in Europe, than for instance in the US (see Warleigh 2000, Mahoney 2007a and 2008 for exceptions). This is a study on the different advocacy activities Euro-federations

and their intra-group position building before the European Commission (hereafter Commission) proposal towards the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED).

It is well known that the cheapest energy and cleanest energy is the energy not consumed. Although energy efficiency relatively old policy domain in climate and energy politics, there has been limited legislative action for energy efficiency in terms of strength at the EU level (Hennigsen 2011), until recently. Energy efficiency contributes to EUs main overall goals which are to combat climate gas mitigation, strengthening the security of energy supply as well as creating jobs and economic growth (Commission 2011a; Commission 2011c). Energy Efficiency has also been recognized as the most cost-effective policy area for reducing CO_2-emissions, in addition to be economically beneficial for end-users through to smaller energy bills (Hennigsen 2011: 131). It is noteworthy that in spite of these long-term benefits attached to energy efficiency, the final policy outcome of the directive is rather modest in terms of the total energy savings amount. In Europe today, buildings account for approximately 40 percent of the total energy use and 36 percent of the total of EUs CO_2-emissions (Commission 2008c: 8). However, realizing this unexploited potential for increased energy savings has been proved difficult. The main obstacles to attain energy savings largely stems from the high up-front costs and the limited financial sources to building renovation. Energy efficiency is that only part EUs climate and energy package that will most likely not meet the stated target of 20 percent energy consumption reduction. Instead, the Directive introduces binding policy instruments. The main requirements of the EED is that member states have to achieve energy end-use savings of 1.5 percent each year by the energy suppliers or distributors operating on the member states territory, calculated after the expected 2020 level of consumption (Commission 2012). This policy instrument is a so called Energy Efficiency Obligations (EEO) arrangement. However, energy suppliers can themselves decide where to implement measures to attain energy savings. Through the EEO policy instrument, energy suppliers and distributors have become responsible for a 1.5 percent annual reduction of their consumers total energy end-use. Another central feature of EED is to increase the renovation rate of buildings by the national governments: the EED prescribes a 3 percent renovation rate annually for public buildings, owned or occupied by the central government, as well as ordering member states to draw up national strategies for long term renovation of the rest of the building stock (Commission 2012). The study is primarily concerned with how leading

European associations approached the policy design of the Directive, both with regard to binding energy efficiency targets and policy instruments to attain the targets as such.

1.2 Research Questions

This study is a case study on the European associations lobbying efforts and interaction towards the Commission during the pre-legislative stage of the EED. Seeking access to the Commission directly is only one of the many venues which interest groups can pursue, where the European Parliament (EP), the Council, national governments and even the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can also be targeted for interest groups advocacy efforts (Ydersbond 2011: 11 – 12). However, there are good arguments to focus on the Commission as a single access point with regard to the EED. The pre-legislative period of a proposal is widely conceived to be the most fertile stage for interest groups to influence legislation (Crombez 2002; Eising 2007a; Bouwen 2009: 22). Being responsible for regulating a single market consisting of almost 500 million people and 27 national regulatory systems, the Commission is a small bureaucracy that often lacks full information about the problem it has to solve (Hix and Høyland: 2011: 182). Serving as a political neutral body and having mainly a technocratic function, the Commission usually requires a lot of technical information to accomplish its tasks (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009; Chalmers 2013a: 41). Interest groups that want to influence legislation early would thus do well in meeting the Commission demands for expert information early. Studying lobbyism as a transaction of information has been firmly acknowledged in earlier research (Austen-Smith 1993; Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009; Klüver 2013; Chalmers 2011; 2013a: 40). The Commission has also been identified as the central target for interest groups lobbying (Gullberg 2008b; Chalmers 2013b: 3). Business groups do also more often lobby the Commission, than the EP, because this is perceived to be more cost-efficient to achieve their aims (Gullberg 2008a). Studies also show that interest groups have more contact in general with the Commission, than other EU institutions (Eising 2009: 140 – 41), and that interest groups are especially more prone to lobby the bureaucracy when policy content is rather technical (Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012). The Commission also has a tendency to cooperate with European associations by granting them a higher degree of access, than for instance firms (Bouwen (2004: 356). Moreover, recent research suggests that the Commission has increasingly acquired the role and competencies of a more supranational entity in climate and energy politics (Eikeland 2011; Wettestad, Eikeland and Nilsson 2012).

The study will propose a model to explain the demand and supply of information between the Commission and interest groups, with the starting point of Bouwen`s theory of "access goods". This theory asserts that interest groups access to policy-makers in the EU, are mainly driven by the European institutions informational need (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009). This framework will be complemented with theory and evidence from recent research that investigates how interest groups are able to meet these informational demands (Chalmers 2011; 2013a). The ability to supply information by interest groups is mainly understood by Chalmers (2011) as the interest groups capacity for gathering information. This information gathering includes their abilities to monitor and anticipate policy developments, as well as their strategies to produce policy relevant research information. Interest groups can also choose to transmit this information through different mediums (Chalmers 2011; 2013a). Put together, the demand and supply for information between decision makers and lobbyists can be seen as model for resource exchange. Interest groups can also work in alignment with other actors to supply what the Commission demands. The study therefore further aims to investigate how interest groups coordinated themselves and how they aggregated a joint advocacy position between them. This was a prominent feature of the pre-proposal stage for some groups, since many informants reported that a significant part of their advocacy efforts went to establishing a formal coalition. At the EU level, coalition building is thought to occur less seldom than for instance in the US (Mahoney 2007a: 2008). The study will therefore draw on earlier theory and empirical evidence of coalition building between interest groups from the American context in order to explore the determinants behind interest groups decision to form a coalition. The research question for this study is thus two-tiered. The first question targets the overall access of interest groups to Commission, from desk officers to the Cabinet. The purpose of the second question refers to the specific case of developing and aggregating the Coalition for Energy Savings, which is a case of coalition building between various European associations. The motivation behind the latter question is to explore under which circumstances European associations engages in formal coalition building.

1. What kind of "access goods" did the European associations supply to the Commission before the EED proposal, and what strategies did they employ to do so?

2. Why did some of the Euro-federations establish a coalition to promote energy efficiency, and how did they aggregate a joint advocacy position among them?

1.3 The Role of European Federations in the EU

Ernst Haas (1958) described in one of the earliest accounts for European integration how civil loyalties could transfer through organizations from the national to the European level, up to the point till they become agents of integration themselves. This still seems some way off. However, one does not need admit the fact that civil loyalty has not changed to the supranational level, to concede that Brussels has become the center of gravity for European interest groups (Richardson 2000; Hix and Høyland 2011). The drive towards the single market and concomitant transfer of competencies, have made business interests frontrunners of EU integration in order to influence legislation (Hix and Høyland 2011: 165; Greenwood 2011: 65). This is natural as firms, which often look to their Euro-federation for political representation, carries the cost and benefits of EU regulation (Majone 1996). Today, the civil society in Brussels is more developed than in any of the other European capitals in terms of number of actors (Hix and Høyland 2011: 165). Euro-federations are only sub-species of the whole EU interest group population (Eising 2009: 18), but because they aggregate a joint position among their members, they tend be considered as authoritative by the Commission (Bouwen 2002: 2004; Greenwood 2011). As such, they are what Knill (2001) calls "interface actors", since they face both inwards towards their members and outwards on the European level to represent their interest constituency. This makes them especially well suited to mediate internally between interests across different institutional levels and related sectors (Knill 2001: 237 – 238).

For their members, the European federations` main functions are to gather information about EU policy developments, liaise between and represent their members, as well as develop common positions and open up linkages to the EU-institutions (Eising 2009: 65 – 67). They therefore tend to have greater access to policy makers, because they can reduce the transaction cost for the officials need to acquire information. This organizational mode is widely perceived to be effective by all involved parties (Greenwood and Cram 1996: 453; Van Schendelen 2005: 129). Although the Euro-federation model has earlier been criticized for its shortcomings such as diffuse member bases, scarce resources and slow internal decision-making (McLaughlin and Jordan 1993), they have over time become more specialized actors with increasing capacity to provide information to policy makers (Greenwood 2011). The organizational autonomy of the Euro-federation is somewhat more debated; to what extent

they are actors in their own right instead of an instrument or a forum for their members (Eising 2009: 66, 184). Knill (2001) points out that some Euro-federations have received too little credit for their importance as policy brokers. Also, they have over time developed a considerable autonomy in devising strategies for their members (Greenwood 2011).

1.4 EUs Climate and Energy Policy

EUs energy and climate policy went from being in a state of "relative neglect", to a sudden rise of legislative acts and proposals in the mid-2000s (Duffield and Birchfield 2011: 5). The advancement of creating a single energy market had for a long time been on the agenda, but new measures in the field renewable energy, emissions trading and energy efficiency was also put forth. The goals for each of these sectors became integrated in an "energy and climate" package which was presented by the Commission in 2008 (Duffield and Birchfield 2011: 5 – 6), and formally adopted by the Council on year later. A preceding green paper and action plan had set forth the targets, namely to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emission by 20 percent, achieve 20 percent of energy consumption from renewable sources by 20 percent, and reduce energy consumption by 20 percent, all to be attained by the year 2020 (Commission 2008a; Duffield and Birchfield 2011: 5). These are frequently referred to as the "20-20-20" targets. Although recognized of being of equal importance as the other policy areas in the climate and energy package (Hennigsen 2011), energy efficiency is the last domain to be addressed through independent legislation. To improve the state of energy efficiency, an Energy Efficiency action plan was launched with a subsequent Energy Efficiency Directive, which was proposed in June 2011 and finally passed in October 2012. Two preceding directives for energy efficiency (2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC) are subsequently repelled. Apart from being one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce the emissions of GHG-emissions (Hennigsen 2011), energy efficiency is central to curb the increasing energy demand in Europe (Commission 2008b; IEA: 2010; Commission 2011a). Figure 1 shows that the EU was not on track to meet this target; without the EED, EU would achieve only 10 percent of the 20 percent target. With measures introduces from the EED, it is expected that the European community can reduce its energy consumption by 15 percent in 2020, when the transport sector is omitted (Commission 2012)[1]. The energy efficiency domain is thus most

[1] Energy sales for transport purposes is excluded from the directive, is this constitute an independent policy area. Regulations of the transport sector could be expected to reduce energy consumption by around two percent (Commission 2011a).

likely the single part of EUs climate and energy package which will not meet the adopted target.

Figure 1: EUs expected achievement of the "20-20-20" targets, before the adoption of EED.



Source: Commission 2011e

1.5 EUs Energy Efficiency Policy: New Solutions to an Older Problem?

"A critical first step in the design of effective policies for improving electricity end-use efficiency is examining the regulatory framework for and participation of electric utilities. (...) Electricity utilities might play an important role in implementing a number of such programmes (...). (…) it is essential that governments and utilities work co-operatively in designing and implementing effective policies to improve end-use efficiency. Many of the actions that might be considered desirable by governments are best implemented by utilities. But if the utilities view the policy as conflicting with their own business objectives, effective implementation may be hampered."

(IEA 1989: 125f, quoted from Steuwer 2013: 2)

The principal part of the EED is the introduction of binding measures rather than binding targets. The most important policy measure which is set forth is energy-end use savings targets through the policy instrument referred to as Energy Efficiency Obligations. As the quote illustrates, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has for a long time identified one of the main to challenges to improve energy efficient end-use, namely how to include the electric

utilities. Despite the apparent benefits to energy efficiency such as reduced GHG emissions as well as being financially beneficial (since upgrades would eventually pay for themselves through reduced energy expenditures), the overall political integration in the field of energy efficiency has been low. The newly introduced EEO instrument could offer some remedy to this, by making energy suppliers and transmitters responsible for energy savings in the end-use sector across the EU. Henningsen (2011) points out that the EU, as well as the IEA, has been consistent in identifying the necessary prescriptions to reduce energy consumption, while not delivering the needed instruments. The EED proposal introduced two main measures to improve this state, namely by suggesting new policy instrument in making a Energy Supplier Obligations scheme mandatory for all EU member states, in addition to an three percent annual renovation of public buildings. In order to increase Europe's performance in energy efficiency, measures would have to be directed towards the sector in which the greatest potential for energy savings lies, which are in buildings (Commission 2011c: 11). In Europe, buildings accounts for approximately 40 percent of Europe's total energy end-use, whereas heating and lightning counts for most of the energy consumption in buildings (Commission 2011a; 2011c). Today, most of the energy efficiency investments are directed towards new buildings rather than old building refurbishments, although existing buildings make up the largest share of the worlds energy end-use (IEA 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit 2012: 3). Since energy consumption spans almost all sectors of society, measures to improve savings have multiple implementation possibilities (such as for instance industry or transportation). But in order to attain the largest amount of energy savings, the renovation process of private and public buildings and how to improve the energy performance of appliances are crucial, as it is the residential sector where the greatest energy savings potential is (Commission 2011a: 3).

A weakness is in the EEO instrument as adopted, is that the policy design of these are not prescribed after the year 2020 in the EED. Although there are no concrete steps in the EED for this policy design beyond the year 2020, the Directive specify in article 1.1 that the framework is established in order to "pave the way for further energy efficiency improvements beyond that date" (Commission 2012: 10). It is possible that a revision will further build on the introduced instruments. A strengthening of the EEO framework could potentially introduce policy instruments that exist in some of the EU member countries, such

as Tradable White Certificate scheme (TWCs), where trading of energy savings are permitted. Such policy designs are more thoroughly explained in chapter two.

To reach the target EU has set itself, energy consumption must in absolute terms be reduced by 368 Million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe), after the adopted 20 percent target from 2007 (EED guidebook 2013a). This is calculated after the projected energy consumption in 2020, which is 1842 Mtoe. In the Directive, the 20 percent target is identified to be 1474 Mtoe in absolute terms (Commission 2012: 12). As seen in figure 2, the EU will most likely fail to meet the target of 20 percent reduction with 190 Mtoe. To make up for this gap, the Commission has proposed a two-step approach, where member states in the first phase determines national energy efficiency targets and programmes. If these are not sufficient to reach the 20 percent target, the Commission will most likely further suggests further measures after the evaluation of the Directive is due in 2016 (Commission 2012: 26 - 27).

Figure 2: EU 20 % energy savings target: the target gap (EED guidebook 2013a).



1.6 Theory

The responsibility to initiate legislative proposals in the EU grants the Commission an agenda setting status (Bouwen 2002). When policy is being formulated, it is mostly rational for interest groups to target the agenda-setter (Crombez 2002). The agenda-setting phase is generally conceived to be the most fertile phase to exert influence since changes in the policy content can be made more easily (Crombez 2002; Eising 2007a; Bouwen 2009: 22). To understand how interest groups influenced the Commission on the EED proposal, a model of demand and supply for resources is put forth. This model takes the point of departure as Bouwen`s framework of access goods (Bouwen 2002). Access goods are those goods the EU institutions wants back from giving access to non-state actors (Bouwen 2002: 369), which is considered to be information (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009; Beyers 2004; Chalmers 2011; 2013a; Gullberg 2011). Theories according to demand side factors such as what kind of information the Commission needs will be presented (Bouwen 2002) and complimented with theory and evidence about interest groups strategies for information supply (Chalmers 2011; 2013a). These supply side factors take into account which extent the interest groups possess the *actual capacity* to meet the informational demands by the Commission (Chalmers 2013a). The interest groups ability to gather information consists of their capacity to monitor policy developments through different sources, while the interest groups research strategies concerns how they produce relevant policy information (Chalmers 2011: 472). This also includes the strategies of interest groups for supplying their produced information to decision makers.

In order to answer research question two on how interest groups established a coalition, earlier research mainly from the context of US politics will be presented and elaborated. Research on interest groups coalitional behavior at the EU stage has been comparatively less examined than in the US. This might be because interest groups in the EU are believed to form issue specific coalitions less often than their American counterparts (Mahoney 2008: 172). The study will therefore draw on theory and evidence from US context to explain coalition building, combined with insights from previous studies of interest groups coalition behavior at the EU level. The American body of literature emphasize under which conditions interest groups decide to work in alignment with others and adopt a joint position (Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999; Mahoney 2008). There are two main contributing factors to coalition building, namely the characteristics of the involved interest groups, and characteristics

pertaining to the specific nature of the policy area. In order to understand when and why coalitions between interest groups develop, factors such as previous experience with cooperation and the issue context which they face will be scrutinized. The factors related to the issue context such as narrow interest constituencies, shared competencies between groups and the relative opposition they face are central explanations. Also what factors that can facilitate intra-group cohesion inside a formal coalition will be given attention. The decision by interest groups to collaborate formally will also be examined in the context of the energy efficiency policies at the EU level.

1.7 Research Design

Measuring influence is acknowledged to be one of the most challenging concepts to define in political science (Chalmers 2011: 471). Dür (2008a: 561) understands influence as the ability of an actor "to shape a decision in line with her preferences". Applied to the EU level, there are many caveats to attempting measuring influence, such as the presence of different channels of influence and the different stages influence can be wielded in (Dür 2008a: 561). Studying access is generally thought to be a precondition for influence (Bouwen 2002; Gullberg 2011: 474). This study is preoccupied with the lobby efforts of Euro-federations during the pre-legislative phase of the EED. It therefore only looks at the interest groups access to the Commission as an indicator for interest groups influence. However, it is possible for interest groups to have a high degree of access to policy-makers and still be ineffective in translating it into influence on policy output (Bouwen 2002; Dür and de Bièvre 2007a). But overall, having access to decision makers implies a better position to influence policy makers, compared to those who don't have access. Lobbyism can broadly be defined as "interest groups contact with – and activities directed at – decision makers in attempt to influence public policy" (Gullberg 2008a: 2965). Since this study is concerned with the demand and supply of informational between the Commission and interest groups, the study is limited in scope by looking at formal channels of influence, such as seeking access to policy makers through formal channels[2] (Bouwen and McCown 2007). Other channels of influence through

[2]Bouwen and McCown (2007) also suggest legal litigation as an independent lobby strategy. In this case it is impossible as there have been no court cases over the EED or any other energy efficiency legislation, to my knowledge.

non-institutionalized participation such as informal meetings with decision-makers (Gullberg 2008a: 2965), is not of main consideration.

As a rather understudied domain within EUs climate and energy policy, there is little information available on energy efficiency. The study therefore aims to cover the change of interest groups constellations during the build-up process of the EED by process tracing. This is necessary to cover the chain of events leading up to the establishment of the Coalition for Energy Savings. This is relevant as some interest groups and environmental NGOs were active in building position with other actors to advance the status of energy efficiency and the status of 20 percent binding targets in particular, in order to shape the Commission's proposal. Since coalition formation occurs rather infrequently at the EU level than in the US (Mahoney 2007a; 2008), the study will take a theory development approach in order to examine the conditions for coalition building among Euro-federations. The aim is to identify which factors that has to be present for a coalition to form and when coalition building between Euro-federations is likely occur. This explorative approach is however grounded in former theory and empirical evidence from the US context (Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999), as well as insights from coalition formation at the EU level (Pijneburg 1998; Warleigh 2000).

Since energy efficiency is an encompassing sector in terms of the potential involved parties, a strategic selection of interest groups was necessary. Attaining a perfect sample of all affected parties by the legislation would be very difficult within the limited scope of the assignment. Informants from the most important sectors such as energy producers, building and construction industry, enterprise and environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were approached in order to create a representative and balanced sample of stakeholders. In order to answer the question of coalition building, four the interviewed interest groups were also founding members of the Coalition for Energy Savings, as well as interviews was conducted with a former and a present coalition employee. Since talking to all the members about their coalition building activities would hardly be feasible within the given scope of time, these were key informants. Data was collected through interviews with representatives from leading European associations and from other sources such as research studies, consultations hearings, interest groups position papers and web sources.

1.8 Delimitations

Interest groups can be defined as "all societal actors who have a political interest, who are organized, and do not strive for public office" (Beyers, Eising and Maloney 2008: 106-107). This definition does not exclude other actors engaged in advocacy efforts, such as think-tanks, research institutes and consultancies. In this study, only Euro-federations were approached for interview, besides those who were active as staff inside the Coalition for Energy Savings. Companies were not approached due to the established preference of the Commission to work Euro-federations early in the legislative procedure (Bouwen 2004). Research institutes and think-tanks were not approached in order to preserve the sample for stakeholders who have a clear adopted preference in the legislation. Since the study is preoccupied with the pre-legislative phase of the EED, other venues for interest groups at the EU level such as the EP and the Council are not of primary concern. Since energy efficiency has been overlooked in comparison with the other parts of the climate and energy package (Hennigsen 2011), it is important to study those groups who where central agenda setters during the pre-legislative process of the EED. It is therefore reasonable to focus on the supranational stage when a relatively new policy area is formulated in an encompassing manner. Also, looking at interest groups from various member countries during the pre-legislative of the EED phase is also hardly feasible as there are very few nationally specialized interest associations for energy efficiency in Europe today. For instance, Germany has only one interest group specialized in the promotion of energy efficiency services[3] versus the twenty-five associations engaged in renewable energy production[4]. The study does also not consider the lobbying activities from different Euro-federations or their members' advocacy towards the member states, as it is not feasible within the given scope of time. Such an analytical potential is also exacerbated by the fact that very few interest groups within the energy efficiency domain are sufficiently bestowed to lobby many channels at the same time. This is especially relevant for the building sector, as representatives from the sector did indeed confirm that their sector was struggling financially in many countries.

[3] Germanys only specialized interest groups for the promotion of energy efficiency is "Deutsche Unternehmensinitiative Energieeffizienz e.V." (DENEFF), established in 2011. To my knowledge, there are no other interest groups specialized in energy efficiency present in other EU countries today.

[4]The number twenty-five is counted as the number of members in the national umbrella organization for renewable energy, Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energie e. V. (BEE).

Since energy use spans nearly all sectors of society, energy efficiency is a complex policy area (Hennigsen 2011). This implies that it is necessary to narrow down the selection of policy instruments from the EED which is included within the scope of the study. The study therefore only considers interest groups lobby efforts about 1) binding energy targets, 2) energy efficiency obligations, 3) public building refurbishment and 4) long-term roadmaps for building renovation, which were the parts of highest salience to most of the interest groups in the EED.

1.9 Outline of the Thesis

In chapter two, the complexity of regulation the energy efficiency sector is further explained. Chapter three presents the theoretical framework for demand and supply towards the Commission, as well as earlier theories and empirical evidence on interest groups` coalition building. Chapter four outlines the method of the study. Chapter five presents the findings of the study, where the general findings of information demand and supply is presented. Thereafter the advocacy activity of every interest group in the study towards the EED is outlined. Then the process behind forming the Coalition for Energy Savings is traced with explanations provided from earlier theory and empirical evidence is outlined together with a further discussion the conditions coalitions form. Chapter six summarizes the findings from the study with some tentative conclusions under which circumstances coalition can be expected to form at the EU level.

2 Background

This chapter will briefly present the context for energy efficiency in the EUs climate and energy policy, as well as nationally existing energy efficiency policy schemes and instruments. Then the regulatory problems facing increased governance of the energy efficiency sector is discussed, as well as a more in-depth presentation of the policy instruments proposed in the EED.

2.1 The Role of Energy Efficiency in EUs Climate and Energy Policy

In the EU today, the single greatest potential for energy savings lies in the current building stock (Commission 2011c: 11). Increased investments in energy efficiency and savings are crucial to meet EU long-term climate and energy goals, such as reducing GHG emission by 80 – 95 percent in 2050 compared to 1990 levels[5] (Commission 2010; Commission 2011b; Commission 2011c: 11). Following from the Directive for energy efficiency end-use (ESD) in 2006, member states were obliged to introduce National Energy Efficient Action Plans (NEEAPs) and report on their efforts in improving energy efficiency to the Commission and establish national indicative energy efficiency targets (Commission 2009; (Hennigsen 2011: 135 – 36). The ESD also commits energy companies to promote energy efficiency among the customers in the end-use sector, although these obligations has been criticized for containing little concrete and too few mandatory measures (Hennigsen 2011: 135). The NEEAPs introduced largely reflect national policy prioritizations across member countries (Commission 2009). In a later assessment by the Commission, member states were subject to open critic for being too unambitious and not doing enough in order to achieve the adopted 20 percent energy efficiency target: "The quality of National Energy Efficiency Action Plans, developed by Member States since 2008, is disappointing, leaving vast potential untapped" (Commission 2010: 3). Earlier policy measures within the energy efficiency field also include addressing new buildings such as the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) and

[5]Improving energy efficiency can broadly be defined as delivering "more services for the same energy input, or the same services for less energy input" (IEA 2013). This entails that the improvement is caused from technological improvement and not through the change of fuels (IEA 2012: 271). This is distinct from the concept of energy savings, which refers to: "an amount of saved energy determined by measuring and/or estimating consumption before and after implementation of an energy efficiency improvement" (Commission 2012: 10).

the Eco-design Directive (see figure 3). The EPBD prescribes the energy efficiency measures in new buildings, with the aim to make them almost nearly zero-emitters by 2020, but has been let down by the majority of member states through lack of compliance (Euractiv 2013a). The Eco-design Directive targets mainly the energy product labeling of appliances. As the last independent policy area of EUs climate and energy package, the energy efficiency domain is also the exception in not having adopted a clear long-term market-based mechanism. Both the Renewable directive and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) emphasize market based instruments as policy instruments to achieve the stated goals by establishing tradability among set quotas (Toke 2008; Wettestad 2010). The motivation behind pursuing market-based instruments in energy and climate policy is because of their potential to correct market failures cost-efficiently (Commission 2007: 3), although they can often face problems when introduced in practice (Tingaard Svendsen 1999: 109).

With the successive opening of the electricity and gas markets in the EU to free competition, compatible policy instruments in order to promote energy efficiency in the end-use sector will eventually have to be advanced (Bertoldi and Huld 2006: 215). Policy instruments to regulate energy efficiency in end-use have often been referred to as energy supplier obligations or white certificates (Bertoldi et.al.2010; Steuwer 2013). The Commission has earlier expressed interest in adopting a so called Tradable White Certificates scheme (TWCs)[6]. A foregoing green paper on energy efficiency stated that the Commission was considering preparing for a possible solution for an EU wide Tradable White Certificate scheme, which would allow trade of saved energy schemes among member states, as a possible policy instrument to realize the scenario of reducing energy consumption by 20 percent (Commission 2005). The foregoing energy end-use efficiency and service directive also emphasized this approach (Commission 2006: 69): "(…) the commission shall examine whether it is appropriate to come forward with a proposal for a Directive to develop the market approach in energy efficiency improvement by means of white certificates". However, this idea of introducing white certificate schemes was dropped in the EED proposal by the Commission, since it would create larger administrative burdens (Commission 2011c: 11). A white certificate scheme entails

[6] As an instrument to regulate energy end-use, EEOs meets the classification of a so-called baseline-and-credit scheme, while the ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme (Steuwer 2013: 29 – 35). So called cap-and-trade schemes determines an overall emission cap, implying that only a given number of emissions are permitted (Steuwer 2013: 35). For every unit of emission, the emitter has a permit that might be sold to other actors. Within energy efficiency, TWCs refer to trade with certified energy savings. Such policy design is described in section 2.2.

establishing certificates to which a certain amount of savings belongs, and that can be traded as a commodity (Bertoldi et.al 2010: 1461 – 63). Schemes with tradable certificates costs more to administer as a public bodies that can certify and monitor the trade would be needed established, although this could be regarded as a one-off installation cost to facilitate the trading on an operational market (Commission 2011d: 34). However, trading is not needed per se to enable energy savings. Subordinating energy efficiency measures to the ETS-umbrella has also earlier been discussed, but such an arrangement face problems in how to quantify the different emission savings separately (Bertoldi and Huld 2006: 215).

As seen in figure 3, the EU has until the adoption of EED had more of a patchwork approach to its energy efficiency policy. The different measures for energy efficiency relates to different stages in the energy chain where savings can be gained and counted: energy production, transformation, distribution and final consumption (Commission 2010: 6). Whereas Combine Heating and Power (CHP) concern the generation and transformation of power, The Energy Service Directive regulates energy consumption in the end-use sector. Energy efficiency obligations targets final energy consumption, where energy efficiency performance is designated to be carried out in energy end-use, which is most often in buildings or through appliances. The EED thus takes EUs energy efficiency policies one step further from what they were, by unifying different instruments and regulations that has been adopted (principally the Directives from 2004 and 2006) into a larger piece of legislation. Another important aspect of the EED is that it also places a clear responsibility on delivering energy savings on the energy suppliers by those member states that opt to introduce energy efficiency obligation schemes.

Figure 3: Timeline of central EU acts within the energy efficiency domain.

16.12.2002: Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) (2002/91/EC).

11.02.2004: Directive for Combined Heat and Power Production (CHP) (2004/8/EC).

22.06.2005: Doing More with Less; Green Paper on Energy Efficiency.

06.07.2005: Eco-design Directive (2005/32/EC).

15.04.2006: Directive on energy end-use efficiency and services (2006/32/EC).

19.10.2006: Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential.

13.11.2008: Second Strategic Energy Review: EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan.

18.11.2008: Energy efficiency – delivering the 20 percent target.

08.06.2009 – 03.08.2009: Evaluation and Revision of the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. Public consultation.

23.06.2009: Synthesis of the complete assessment of all 27 National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) by the Commission.

29.11.2009: Recast of European Eco-design Directive (2009/125/EC).

19.05.2010: Recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2010/31/EU)

18.06.2010: Energy labeling Directive (2010/30/EU).

8.3.2011: The Energy Efficiency Plan 2011.

8.3.2011: Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050.

22.6. 2011: Commissions proposal for the Energy Efficiency Directive.

15.02.2012 – 18.05.2012: Commission consultation on financial sources for investing in Energy Efficiency.

25.10.2012: Energy Efficiency Directive officially adopted (2012/27/EU).

30.04.2013: National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) submitted by member states to the Commission.

2.2 Energy Efficiency Policy Designs and Instruments in the EU Member Countries

The energy efficiency policy landscape varies from country to country, even though many governments have similar motivations for pursuing energy efficiency and face similar barriers to implementing policy.
(IEA 2010: 33).

Stemming from the energy crisis in 1973 where the supply of oil was drastically reduced, all European countries had developed some sorts of national energy efficiency policy by the middle of the decade (Waide and Buchner 2008; Bertoldi et.al. 2010; IEA 2010). Among the current nationally existing energy efficiency policy schemes, many EU member countries have introduced variations over same policy instruments. In Europe today, France, Italy, Denmark, the United Kingdom (UK), and the region of Flanders in Belgium have independently undertaken different versions of Energy Supplier Obligations (ESO)[7] or TWCs (Bertoldi et.al. 2010). More recently, countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania have announced in their NEEAPs the intention to establish policy instruments that regulate energy end-use (Steuwer 2013: 363). Such ESO-regulation/TWCs are usually either adopted as a stand-alone policy or as a part of a larger system of certification, with the additional possibility of trading with certificates (Bertoldi et.al 2010). The common feature of the policy design of Energy Supplier Obligations is that energy companies involved in the whole energy chain (from production to retailers) are obliged to attain a quantity of energy savings target within a limited date, usually determined by the government ministry or regulator (Steuwer 2013: 32). The targets are set politically and can first be expressed in a relative number (such as percentage) on how much the energy consumption shall be reduced, and thereafter become converted to an absolute target calculated after earlier amounts of energy supplied and/or extrapolations for future energy consumption (Steuwer 2013: 32). When the saving obligations is formulated as quota and certificated so that it is guaranteed that an amount of savings has been attained, an administrative system that facilitates the option to trade is also required to establish a TWC scheme (Steuwer 2013: 32; Bertoldi et.al. 2010). Attained energy efficiency savings have to be verified by an independent party which administers and oversees compliance, while another public body authorizes the validity of energy savings, with the authority to sanction if necessary (Bertoldi et.al 2010: 1455 – 56; Steuwer 2013).

[7] The Energy Efficiency Obligations is the name for the policy instrument used in the EED text, although it pertains to a form of ESO instrument. Bertoldi et.al (2010) refers to the policy instrument by the name Energy Savings Obligations, although they are only different labels for the same measure.

Moreover, the obligation on energy suppliers does not equal an absolute cap of energy delivered to the end-users, hence increasing energy efficiency does not equal an absolute reduction of energy consumption, although the target (most often TWh) is expressed in an absolute quantity (Steuwer 2013: 33). In those countries where the possibility to trade exists, energy companies might also buy the needed quotas through TWCs from other actors. Companies can chose to implement measures directly in end-use sectors or make arrangements with other parties such as own daughter companies or hired third parties, (often so called Energy Service Companies - ESCOs), to do it for them (Bertoldi et.al 2010; Stewuer 2013: 33). These national schemes generally differ in terms of energy efficiency financing, measurement and overall system boundaries. Some countries measure their savings in either in primary energy[8], final energy or directly counting CO_2-savings from the obligations (Bertoldi et.al. 2010). A common feature of the implementation process is to determine how savings are to be measured, which is usually done by defining a reference scenario, either on an *ante* or *post* basis[9] (Bertoldi et.al.2010: 1455). Only in France and Italy, trading with established policy portfolios for supplier obligations exists in combination with full tradable certificates, whereas Denmark, the UK and the region of Flanders in Belgium relies on subsidies or partially government financial support to perform energy efficient installations (Bertoldi et.al. 2010). Countries such as Denmark and France have also incorporated non grid-bound types of energy such as CHP and liquid gas (LPG) in their national schemes (Bertoldi et.al. 2010: 1463 – 64).

2.3 Market barriers to energy efficiency

> Energy efficiency is the most cost effective way to reduce emissions, improve energy security and competitiveness, make energy consumption more affordable for consumers as well as create employment, including in export industry. Above all, it provides tangible benefits to citizens: average energy savings for a household can amount to €1 000 per year.
>
> (Commission 2010:6)

The advantages of energy efficiency have for a long time been identified by the IEA, the Commission as well as other actors. For instance, a recent study by the German development

[8] Primary energy is produced at the source; final energy is measured at the amount supplied to the end-users (IEA 2013).

[9] Energy savings calculated in comparison with the energy use before or after an installation is undertaken.

bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) stated that for each euro invested in energy efficiency by the public, four euros are accrued back to the government in forms of increased tax receipts from employment and reduced energy costs in Germany (KfW 2013; Euractiv 2013b). One could perhaps expect that if energy efficiency upgrades were really that beneficial as the quote indicates, these unexploited and easy-gained profits would have been picked already. The answer to why this is not the case is that the obstacles towards energy efficiency can be seen as a complex case of market failure. A market failure is present when the markets are not accountable in an adequate way for the "true cost of their economic activity" (Commission 2007: 3). The underlying purpose of regulatory intervention is to correct these market failures. The justification for intervention is to attain a more cost-effective outcome, which appears to be similar for the motivation to invest in renewable energy: "inadequate energy security and climate protection with negative consequences for the public interest" (Szarka 2010: 843). With regard to energy efficiency, this can be done by for instance influencing prices (trough taxation or incentives) or limiting absolute quantities (emission trading), as well as providing firms with an incentive to pursue innovation and investments in new technologies (Commission 2007: 3 – 6).

To improve the energy performance of the existing building stock, a strong regulatory intervention is needed. A general obstacle towards increased energy efficiency policies stems from the sheer potential number of parties involved, since reducing energy consumption spans nearly all sectors of society (Henningsen 2011: 132). For households, firms and private energy consumers, the main barriers can generally be ascribed to high transaction costs in assessing their energy use as well as constraints on access to capital, together with a lack of awareness of the energy saving potential. The transactions costs includes the costs of gathering, assessing and applying information about potential savings measures, as well as negotiating and enforcing such contracts with third parties (Schleich and Gruber 2008: 453). Constrained access to capital entails that firms or households may not profit from energy efficient installations when the interest rates from private capital to undertake installations are higher than the expected payoff from the upgrades. To pay for building renovation and/or installing new appliances, the start up costs are also high relative to the long pay-back period of energy efficiency actions (Commission 2011a). At last, the consumers demand side for energy efficiency installations would also have to be strengthened since there is a general lack of awareness for energy service performance contracting (Commission 2011a). The EED

achieves to ease some of these hindrances by defining energy savings obligations and defining hitherto common monitoring methodologies, as well as providing different sources of finance (Commission 2012)[10].

2.4 Proposed Policy Instruments in the EED

The Commission did not propose any binding energy efficiency targets in the EED proposal; instead it put forth policy means. The policy designs of these are thus of central importance. The main regulatory interventions in the Commissions proposal can be said to be the instrument of Energy Efficiency Obligations, which is the policy instrument that has the potential to deliver the highest amount of energy savings. The proposed 3 percent renovation rate of public building would be an immediate energy efficiency trigger for the building sector. This section explains the two relevant policy instruments as they were set forth in the Commissions proposal, namely the EEO and the prescription for three percent annual public building renovation.

The logic behind targeting the utilities for implementing such policy instruments that regulate energy efficiency among the final consumers is that they already have a contractual relationship with the customer. They can therefore better assess the "how much energy it is sold to whom and at what time", and they often possess the capacity to undertake energy efficiency installations by having the much needed technical comptence (Waide and Buchner 2008: 304 – 305). Energy companies do also often have the relevant energy efficiency technology at their disposal, as well as being in a better position to develop energy efficiency solutions (Waide and Buchner 2008; Henningsen 2011: 140). Imposing an obligation on utilities to sell less of their main commodity might seem like a paradox; however EEOs will not change their business model in the short term. But when the energy suppliers are imposed to reduce the energy consumption of their customers, this can somewhat change their business relationship with the consumers from being only energy suppliers, to become energy efficiency service providers (Waide and Buchner 2008; Bertoldi et.al.2010: 1468). This can be for instance installing extra insulation or a heating system in the customers' buildings for

[10] In the EED, possible funding sources could from the European level could be made available from the European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Europe Development Bank (Commission 2012: 8).

either a large upfront fee, or a long term payback by the customers' energy bill. If EEOs are implemented efficiently, such policy schemes can be central to facilitate renovation of the building stock in the long run (EED guidebook 2013b). The EEO scheme can possibly be seen as a weak redistributive policy instrument, as it places the responsibility for undertaking energy efficiency installations is directed on the energy suppliers instead of putting any requirements on the consumers (Majone 1996: 63). In the Commissions proposal, a mandatory energy savings in final consumption of 1.5 percent by energy retailers or transmitters was set forth (Commission 2011c: 20). However, the obliged energy suppliers can chose themselves in which sector to deliver the savings (such for instance industry), but the largest potential for energy savings lies in the residential sector.

The other central policy prescription in the EED proposal was a mandatory 3 percent renovation rate of the public building stock by the national governments. Today, the current rates of building renovation lies at 1 percent annually for the EU as a whole and it is expected that in order to achieve the 2050 target, a renovation rate of 2.5 percent is required (BPIE 2010: 108 – 110). It is therefore a need for more building renovation, and the EED proposal emphasized that public authorities at all levels should "fulfill an exemplary role" when it comes to energy performance in buildings (Commission 2011c). Renovation of the public building stock would also trigger market demand for energy efficiency services by stakeholders from the building industry.

3 Theoretical frameworks

There is no perfect model of interest group representation in the EU (Hix and Høyland 2011: 162). Therefore, different theories must therefore be applied in conjugation. Firstly, pluralism and corporatism is briefly outlined as general background concepts. Then a model of supply and demand for resources between European institutions and interest groups is presented and formulated expectations with regard to how interests groups lobbied the Commission. Since formal coalition building occurs seldom at the EU level, it will not be formulated any clear hypotheses due to little theory and empirics, instead tentative expectations are put forth.

3.1 Classic models for interest group representation

Pluralism and corporatism are the traditional ideal types for understanding interest intermediation structures (Hix and Høyland 2011; Michalowitz 2002). Pluralism is the classical model to understand interest groups representation in democratic systems. In an ideal pluralist paradigm, there is always one interest group on each side of every argument (Hix and Høyland 2011: 159). A central requirement for a pluralistic system to function is that interest groups must have equal access to the political process (Hix and Høyland 2011: 160). However, groups can seldom mobilize the same amount of resources, which can bias the access to policy makers. Neo-pluralism claims that this inherent distortion in pluralism can be surmounted if bureaucrats deliberately support groups economically (Hix and Høyland 2011: 161). In the EU, some interest groups have acquired an insider position over time, a so called "elite pluralism" arrangement (Coen 1997). Here, private interest groups dominate over "diffuse" interest due to more resources, a trustworthy reputation and thereby being in a better position to provide information (Coen 1997; Dür and de Bièvre 2007a; Coen and Richardson 2009: 152; Chalmers 2013b: 10). A critic of the pluralist assumptions can be found in the foundational work by Mancur Olson (1971) [1965], where interest intermediation is understood in terms of collective action. Olson points out that the abilities for large and small groups to organize themselves are uneven:

> "The smaller groups – the privileged and intermediate groups – can often defeat the large groups – the latent groups – which are normally supposed to prevail in a democracy. The privileged and intermediate groups often triumph over the numerically superior forces in the latent or large groups because the former are generally organized and active while the latter are normally unorganized and inactive" (Olson 1971: 128).

Benefits are more easily acquired by smaller groups due to stronger incentives for mobilizing compared to latent groups. However, understanding membership in Euro-federations deviates somewhat from Olson`s view since they encompass different organizations such as firms, national associations and NGOs (Greenwood and Cram 1996). The incentives to join a Euro-federation are neither only material; membership is also vindicated through reducing policy uncertainty and access to information (Greenwood and Cram 1996). McLaughlin and Jordan (1993) conceive the rationality of collective action at the EU level with the associated cost of non-membership, as firms without representation have to pay a higher price for equivalent information (Greenwood and Cram 1996; Greenwood 2011: 68). The informational demand can also reduce groups' inclination to free-ride. Many public interest groups in Brussels derive much of their funding from various Directorate Generales (DGs), making Olson`s critic of pluralism exaggerated (Greenwood 2011: 3; Hix and Høyland 2011: 161).

3.1.1 On the Limits of Pluralism and Corporatism

Following from the treaty of Rome, it was attempted to establish passage of corporatism in EUs decision making process, by granting interest groups formal standing in the Economic and Social Committee (Hix and Høyland 2011: 170). However, this committee is only consultative and has retained a weak position in the EU policy process (Eising 2007b: 385). The EU clearly lacks the means to intermediate across sectors to the same degree as corporatism would posit (Streeck and Schmitter 1991), whereas old structures such as business and labor have eroded and new cleavages emerged (Hix and Høyland 2011: 161). Pluralism and corporatism are also concepts developed on the presence of statehood, thus important conditions are missing (Kohler-Koch 1997: 5 – 6); corporatism at the EU level lacks direct and binding participation, while the pluralist assumption of equal access is not fulfilled (Michalowitz 2002: 43 – 44). Both concepts could also co-exist across different policy areas and legislative stages (Michalowitz 2002: 50). The preferences of decision makers and interest groups' incentives in the relevant sector ought to be studied in order to understand policy processes (Andersen and Eliassen 1995; Falkner 2000; Hix and Høyland 2011: 162). The study will now turn to such a model.

3.2 A Model of Resource Exchange

Lobbying in Brussels is widely seen as an exchange where the currency is information (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2009; Broscheid and Coen 2007; Gullberg 2011; Chalmers 2013a; Chalmers 2013b). Studying the exchange of information can be done in terms of both demand side and supply side factors (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2009; Chalmers 2013a; Chalmers 2013b). Since organizations are rarely self-contained with the resources, they often have to make a transaction with other organizations to achieve their goals (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 2: Bouwen 2002). A form of interdependence can therefore be established. On the demand side, the European institution and the legislative stage determine the organizations preferences for information (Bouwen 2002). During the pre-proposal phase, the Commission is assumed to be a strategic actor and have a primary interest in tabling proposals which will be passed by the other institutions (Hix and Høyland 2011: 35 – 37). In addition, it also needs to have legitimacy behind its proposal (Broscheid and Coen 2003; Klüver 2011a). This could for instance to have its proposal backed by popular support or by key market players (Klüver 2013: 45 – 49). On the supply side, interest groups will provide the decision makers in the European institution with information to gain access. Chalmers conceive this to be a function of interest groups capacity to monitor policy developments, gather and provide information, together with their strategies for transmitting it (2011; 2013a). In return for providing resources to the Commission, they can get access and thereby influence policy proposals. Figure 4 present such a demand and supply model for resource exchange. But interest groups might also form a coalition in order to enhance their policy claim. Interest groups might produce or gather information through a coalition to improve their delivery of access goods. Under which circumstances they chose to form coalitions will be further elaborated in section 3.3.

Figure 4: A demand and supply model for resource exchange.



Source: modified after Klüver 2013: 17

3.2.1 The Commissions Need for Information as a Policy Initiator

To explain the Commissions informational need, Bouwens framework (2002; 2004; 2009) of access goods will be employed to analyze the informational demand side. Access goods are goods non-state actors have to offer to the relevant EU institution in order to gain access. These goods are usually different types of information and can be hierarchically ranged. The different types of information can also be divided into two separate categories, namely Expert Knowledge (EK) and political salient information (Chalmers 2011: 46; Mahoney 2008). In drafting proposals, the Commission is assumed to be in highest need of Expert Knowledge (Bouwen 2002: 379). Expert knowledge concerns the expertise and technical know-how it requires from the private sector to understand the market which is subject to regulation. Since

interest groups have specialized information on how a proposal can translate into policies and its potential consequences, these can be traded for access to policy-makers (Bouwen 2002; 2009). Private firms should be the most successful in providing EK, since they are directly in touch with the market and can gather information more easily than European associations (Bouwen 2002; 2009). However, the Commission does not only seek technical information, but also political information as well. Bouwen consider the European association's main strength to provide reliable information about the European policy dimension, which he labels the European Encompassing Interest (EEI) (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2009). An interest is more encompassing the more affected parties that are involved in its formulation. In a later study by Bouwen (2004), it was demonstrated that the Commission preferred information from European associations, which have a competitive advantage in providing information about the overall needs of their policy sector. For the Commission, European umbrella organizations are especially attractive, since they are specialized in brokering out their common interest at the European level (Bouwen 2002: 377; Bouwen 2004). Another type of political information which the Commission needs concerns information about the preferences of relevant domestic actors, but only if a proposal has a high level of saliency in a member state (Bouwen 2002). This is labeled the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI). Unless a member state position on a given issue is of high importance, DEI is usually of inferior value to the Commission since it is generally concerned with the European policy dimension. It should therefore be expected, that the Commission demanded more EK than political information from interest groups, and then EEI over DEI.

3.2.2 Actor Supply of Access Goods to the Commission

In the first section, the informational demand by the Commission was made account for. However, a systematic approach to the supply side of information has been less developed until recent studies. By assuming the information provision of an interest group to be derived from their organizational form, Bouwens framework is intuitive, but according to Rainer Eising, also "piecemeal" (2007b: 385). Since more elaborate theories on how groups can produce the demanded information has been little systematically examined, this section sets forth some assumptions about the supply of access goods to the Commission on basis of combining insights from two recent articles by Adam Chalmers (2011; 2013a). In contrast with Eisings emphasis on how resources counts for interest groups supply of information (2007b; 2009), Chalmers considers the interest groups influence as a result of their capacity to

process information. In the first article, Chalmers considers the influence of interest groups to be caused by their capabilities to gather information and lobby strategies (2011), while in the latter he sets forth which types of information that gives highest access to the EU institutions (Chalmers 2013a). In subsequent chapters, some these proposition both with regard to information production and lobbying tactics will be examined.

To gain access to policy-makers in the Commission, interest groups have to provide the demanded goods. When studying Euro-federations supply of information to the Commission, their capacity to meet the required demand have to be examined (Chalmers 2013a). In a detailed examination of information types, Chalmers finds out that interest groups which supply expert knowledge such, as feasibility information in particular, gets more frequent access to the Commission (Chalmers 2013a: 49). But for an interest group to supply such information, the interest groups capacity to produce relevant information must be taken into account. Being efficient in producing information also involves the regular "pre-advocacy" tasks such as monitoring policy developments and gathering information (Chalmers 2011; 2013b: 13). Chalmers refers to this as information processing: how interest groups gather their information, including their strategy to transmit it (2011: 476). The interest groups ability to gather information consists of their capacity to monitor policy developments through different sources, while the interest groups research strategies concern how they produce relevant policy information (Chalmers 2011: 472). Those interest groups who are able to monitor policy developments more closely, could have an advantage in anticipating what information that will eventually be needed. As such, being embedded in a larger network could give interest groups an advantage by getting information from others "by word of mouth" (Chalmers 2011: 477; 2013b). However, the type of information produced also matters. Good information entails a given exclusiveness, which implies that the receiver can hardly obtain the same information from other sources (Chalmers 2011: 474; 2013a: 51). The more evidence based type of research information it is, the better. Interest groups can produce relevant policy research in-house or delegate it to third parties (Chalmers 2011: 478). Policy information must also be timely and relevant for what the decision makers have on the agenda (Chalmers 2011: 475 – 476). The interest groups capacity to monitor policy developments and to produce relevant policy information is therefore intertwined. It could thus be expected that those interest groups with higher capacity to gather information, got higher access to the Commission.

Other aspects of informational supply by interest groups can be found in what has been called resource dependency. A critical resource dependency is the criticality of a resource which an organization needs in order to continue functioning (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). Controlling the supply of information when the receiver organization is highly dependent upon it is thought to yield high influence for an interest group (Bouwen 2002; Eising 2009: 172). The decision makers and interest groups could therefore grow into becoming dependent on another (Eising 2009: 172 – 175). However, an organizations influence over another does not depend on the sheer amount of information it can supply, but to what extent the receiver organization can replace the information from other sources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 46). If such a relationship occurred over a protracted amount of time between the Commission and interest groups, it could possibly be ascribed to relationship of resource dependency. However, policy makers could are expected to be reluctant and prefer avoiding to be caught in a relationship where one or few groups control the information due to the leverage this gives them (Potters and van Winden 1992; Richardson 2000). Although some interest groups were probably more active in supplying information to the Commission than others, the relationship to the Commission should not be expected in lasting such an extent that it can be characterized as a resource dependency.

Lobbying strategies and information transmission by the interest groups

The channels through which interest groups can chose to send their message are subsumed within two general strategies interest groups uses to gain influence, namely "insider" or "outsider" lobbying. An "insider" strategy entails working with decision-makers while using an "outsider" strategy can for instance be media campaigns or demonstrations (Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012). An insider lobbying strategy has been found to be more effective in order to get access to decision makers than using outside tactics (Beyers 2004; Eising 2007c), because one would generally do better to approach officials with hard facts and figures when the issue is of a more technical art (Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012). Especially during the pre-legislative stage when the Commission is assumed to be in need for technical information (Bouwen 2002), an insider strategy can be assumed to be more favorable to get access. It is therefore reasonable to expect that interest groups used insider strategies in order to get access to the Commission.

In order to be efficient information suppliers, interest groups must also decide on how to allocate their scarce resources and which strategies that can provide them the highest probabilities for success (Hojnacki 1997: 62). The transmission of information is concerned with through which mediums interest groups decide to supply their information (Chalmers 2011: 478 – 479). Klüver (2011a; 2013) studies mainly information supply in terms of length of online consultations submitted by interests groups. But issuing position papers in only one out of many channels a group can use to reach decision makers. In order to be efficient in transmitting information, it could be useful for an interest group to create "new" points of access. It is therefore favorable to have a more extensive repertory in order to deliver information to decision makers (Chalmers 2011: 472 – 473; Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 148). This could for instance be through different mediums such as organizing a conference or host a workshop. It can therefore be expected that those interest groups who had a larger repertory for delivering information also got higher access to the Commission.

3.3 Coalition Formation and Interest Group Interaction

The study will use earlier works on interest groups coalitional behavior as the point of departure in order to explain formal coalition building between European associations (Hojnacki 1997;1998; Pijneburg: 1998; Hula 1999; Warleigh 2000; Mahoney 2007a; 2008). Most research on when and why interest groups form policy coalitions has been done within the context of American politics (Hojnacki 1997; 1998; Hula 1999). This might be because coalition building at the European stage occurs rather seldom, although it is not "entirely absent" from the EU political level (Mahoney 2008: 182). Mahoney conceive the reason for this to be that because of Euro-federations broad membership structure, by being almost "coalitions by themselves" already (2007a: 368; 2008). Evidence from coalition formation among American interest groups suggests that building joint positions is the preferred way to lobby on issues, since pursuing a coalition strategy is perceived as the best option in order to influence policy outcomes (Hula 1999: 25). Applied to the European stage, the little research on actual coalition building is not entirely consistent: Mahoney (2007a; 2008: 174) finds little overall support that Euro-federations joins coalitions at all compared to American interest groups, while Warleigh (2000) conceives that especially NGOs at the EU level have a habit of

working together with business actors to advance their claims. Less is therefore known under what conditions interest groups in the EU decide to establish common positions. Hojnacki et.al notes (2012: 10 – 11) that due to the overall little research on the coalitional activity of interest groups, variables should be employed as only "preliminary" and "suggestive". As such, the theoretical propositions behind investigating coalition formation and later intra-group dynamics have to remain tentative. The decision of interest groups to form coalitions must be seen against the background in which they operate, since all organizations are entrenched in their environment. Ultimately, lobbying is so to speak with Chalmers words, an "inherently interactive" activity (2013a: 41). The background of coalition building is thus the policy subsystem in which the interest groups operates. A large number of actors and institutions found in each area or sector constitute a policy subsystem (Howlett et.al. 2009: 81). The energy efficiency area can be seen as an independent subsystem within the larger energy and climate sector. Accordingly, the resources of the different interest groups within a subsystem can be assumed to be dispersed among them, and that they have to cooperate in order to be effective (Hojnacki 1997; Hojnacki 1998; Carpenter et.al 2004; Chalmers 2013b). Heike Klüver emphasize in her quantitative text analysis that coalition lobbying is a constant feature of EU policy making, by conceiving all organizations that work for the same goal as de facto coalitions (2011a; 2011b 2012a; 2013). However, this approach makes the concept of formal coalition building between interest groups impossible, as it implies that all groups which share preferences constitutes a coalition, even if they don't know each other.

Evidence about coalition formation at the EU levels suggests that coalitions mostly take the form of being so called ad-hoc coalitions or alliances (Pinjeburg 1998; Warleigh 2000; Mahoney 2007a; Mahoney 2008). Ad-hoc coalitions or so called issue networks are generally recognized by having lack of stability and whereas the membership is fluid and unpredictable (Heclo 1978; Richardson 2000: 1008, 1016; Mahoney 2008). Contrary to other models of networks such as iron triangles or policy communities, ad-hoc coalitions are recognized by being open and consisting of a loose connection of people that have a mutual concern over an issue, little interdependence and being relatively open to new members (Heclo 1978; Marsh 1998: 14; Bernhagen 2007: 36 Hula 1999; 4 – 8; Richardson 2000). Another type of cooperation between interest groups and decision makers has been labeled a policy community, which has more stable relationships, fewer participants and exchange of

resources (Marsh 1998: 14). However, features of policy communities to be found at the EU level are unlikely due to the many interest groups present and EUs multi-level governance nature (Richardson 2000). Hula conceives that defining such ad-hoc coalitions more accurately to be practically impossible, since the boundaries of membership is already assumed to fluctuate (1999: 4 – 8). Discussing membership in side an ad-hoc coalition could therefore be contradictory (Hula 1999: 4). According to Mahoney, ad-hoc coalitions are often recognized by having members that represents different types of interests (Mahoney 2008: 168). It is thus a type of collaboration between actors from different policy areas. An ad-hoc coalition is the cooperation between heterogeneous interest groups which unite forces in order to fight for a single issue, either in the short or medium term (Mahoney 2008: 168). Mahoney conceives the degree of coalition as a continuum; from "informal and loose" to coordinated entities with "logos and secretariat" (Mahoney 2008: 167). The shared features of ad-hoc coalition are thus a low degree of formalization and a high degree of autonomy for the members (Pijneburg 1998; Mahoney 2008: 168). Although there is usually a type of leadership in the coalition, they do not tend to establish own membership or any organizational structure (Mahoney 2008: 168). In the case of the EED, European associations did chose to establish a formal coalition with an organizational structure and staff. The study is thus preoccupied with which factors that can explain such coalition building. In subsequent chapters, theories and evidence from earlier research will be employed to test under what conditions issue specific coalitions develop and what facilitates cooperation inside a coalition.

3.3.1 Causes for Coalition Building among Euro-federations

This section outlines different causes for coalition building between interest groups on the background of earlier theory and empirical evidence. Based on earlier evidence from (Mahoney (2008: 172), the main contributing factors to explain coalition formations are the characteristics of involved actors and the political context of the issue nature. Mahoney considers the political context in terms of institutional factors and the specific nature of the policy area as the main factors contributing to coalition formation in the EU and the US (2008). This study will therefore concentrate on the issue specific factors in order to explain coalition building related to the energy efficiency domain. The different organizational and issue specific factors are set forth in the first and second paragraph.

In broad terms, interest groups decide to establish coalitions based on a perception on how to increase their chance for lobbying success (Hojnacki 1997). Mahoney (2008: 168) perceives coalitions to be advantageous from two aspects; first it communicates a signal where the majority of support on an issue lies, and secondly it can be a more efficient mode of cooperation when resources are pooled. Since the American interest group population is recognized by groups which are often smaller and have fewer resources than in in the EU, American groups are more inclined to establish coalitions (Mahoney 2007a; 2008: 171). However, in the EU, lack of resources does not seem to be the primary cause for groups to establish coalitions, but the contrary: in those few events coalition building between European interest groups occur, it is usually more materially bestowed groups that displays most coalitional behavior (Mahoney 2008: 178 – 180). A shared feature of European interest groups that are prone to collaborate is instead that they have done a lot previous experience in collaborating (Mahoney 2008). Hojnacki (1997) finds out that purposive groups (groups representing a social or public interests, such as environmental NGOs), are more likely to engage in cooperation with other actors due to scarcity of resources and the habit of collaboration, than groups that rely only on material incentives. This is supported by Warleigh (2000) which finds out that coalition building could very well be the preferred advocacy strategy and especially for NGOs. Warleigh further points out that NGOs often have to work as "hustlers", because in order to enhance their policy claim, they would do better in teaming up with groups that have competence on questions related to market and technology (2000: 232). In general, those interest groups that have previous experience in collaborating with others groups are more inclined to establish coalitions (Hojacnki 1997: 78). This is supported by other findings on interest groups behavior in larger networks where the inter-organizational trust is essential for groups to develop positions. Carpenter et.al. (2004: 243) finds out that in the American context, the phenomenon of "friendly lobbying" is not only confined to interest groups and aligned politicians, but also occurs between organized interests themselves. Interest groups are more prone to seek out the opinion of other organizations who share the same view and preferences to develop a "coherent interpretation of a policy" and exchange information (Carpenter et.al 2004: 243). Those interest groups that have already established linkages or partnerships with other interest groups could thus be expected to decide establishing a coalition.

In the American context, Marie Hojnacki (1997) examines 5 different cases of coalition building among interest groups with a survey of the involved members. Her findings support that interest groups are most likely to join an ad-hoc coalitions based on their assessments of the opportunity to increase their chance to be successful. However, the perceptions of what is necessary in order to achieve success might vary across policy fields. According to Hula, the causes for an interest group to establish or join a coalition are also a question about when it is convenient to employ such strategies (1999: 53). Therefore the issue context and the constellations of other actors are relevant for a interest groups decision to join a coalition. Especially in cases where the policy content is complex and when the competencies are dispersed among several actors, the likelihood of cooperation increases (Hula 1999: 3 – 5, 26). Hula (1999) considers the tendency for increased collaboration among American interest groups as a reflection of a change in the US interest group population as a whole, where the number of interest groups has proliferated and become more fragmented in terms of specialization. Hence, when the policy subject is complicated and cuts across many interest constituencies such as in energy efficiency, interest group cooperation is more likely. But the level of conflict and issue salience for the stakeholder also matters (Mahoney 2008: 180). In the five different cases of coalition building at the European level Mahoney examines, the highest degree of interest group mobilization for coalition building occurs when the issue at stake is conflictual and there are opposing views on the policy subject (2008: 179). This is in accordance with earlier studies in the US context, where interest groups are found to be more prone in joining coalition if there is substantial opposition on the issue (Hojnacki 1997). Also, the perceived strength of the opposition is matters as well; "when opponents are strong, organizations will see greater benefits in joining a coalition" (Hojnacki 1997: 67). The contest on an issue and the relative opposition an interest group face can be seen against the adversaries which it confronts, such as those who either prefers the status quo to prevail, impose a cost, or deny a benefit to the members of their members (Holyoke 2009: 362). The issue characteristic is thus central, since European associations are also more likely to join a coalition when the policy content has "multiple viewpoints (Mahoney 2008: 180). It should therefore be expected that when there are groups with different angles to their issues, they are prone to seek out a coalition. Moreover, the goal of a coalition should also be formulated simple enough so that is meaningful for groups to be pro- or against the stated objective (Hula 1999: 30 – 32). This is often favorable when the coalitions takes a proactive stance (such as

changing the status quo) and coalesce around a target to which "groups can rally" (Hula 1999: 30 – 32).

As mentioned, European associations did initiate a coalition called the Coalition for Energy Savings during the pre-legislative period of the EED. Taken together, it can be expected that the major determinants behind the decision to establish Coalition for Energy Savings was shared concerns over the status of energy efficiency, although in conjugation with both organizational and issue specific factors. The organizational characteristics are considered by the interest groups character such as the previous habits of collaborating with other interest groups. Especially seeking out different partners for cooperation should be expected for purposive groups. In terms of issue context, when the interest group population and specialization is scattered, coalition building should also be expected as a more efficient lobby strategy. If there is a relatively large opposition on the policy subject, then this should also contribute to the decision to join a coalition. Finally, the goal of the coalition must be sufficiently open so that groups can join without having to compromise too much on details.

3.3.2 Intra-Coalition Behavior

This section considers the internal dynamics within coalitions and which factors that contributes to intra-group coherence. Pijneburg (1998: 307) points out ad-hoc coalitions are prone to encounter problems due to high internal transaction costs. These can for instance be major hurdles for a coalition to function, such as agreeing on positions, distribute burdens and tasks, as well as facilitating internal exchange of information (Pijneburg 1998: 307). However, such collective action problems can be overcome if anybody is willing to take on the task of becoming a coalition leader and/or work as a secretariat and thereby facilitate internal cohesion. Hojnacki finds out that forming a coalition also provide groups with an opportunity to free-ride on their members, although this inclination can decrease when interaction happens regularly (1998: 444). A group that attempts to evade the commitments can thereby be recognized and their reputational inside the coalition might suffer (Hojnacki 1998: 444). Trust building over time can also be essential for groups to conitiue working together. Having an established structure with a coalition broker that facilitates coordination could thus contribute to the reduced likelihood for free-riding and increased accountability (Hojnacki 1998: 455 – 456). The problem of free-riding can be solved by establishing a

degree of formalization in a coalition and offer selective benefits that gives groups a reason to further stay inside it. Hula considers the most relevant benefit for a group to join or remain inside a coalition as information, unless if it has a purposive motivation (1999: 34 – 35). This information could for instance be news about the most recent updates and different threats towards the interest groups' positions or information related to policy research (Hula 1999: 34 – 35). This could also for instance be relevant information such as access to information from research reports. In general, when the degree of formalization increases, groups contributed more to a coalition. It could therefore be expected that increasing the degree of formalization to over come initial transaction costs, and providing benefits such as information sharing facilitated intra-group cohesion.

3.4 Summary of Theoretical Expectations

This chapter has presented a broad theoretical outlook on interest groups relationship with the Commission and the policy dynamics between interest groups. The classical models such as pluralism and corporatism, serve as a background for the interest intermediation structure. In this study, interest groups advocacy efforts towards the Commission are understood in terms of demand and supply for information. The Commission is expected to be in highest need of technical information, and then political information such as the European encompassing interest. On the supply side, groups that have a larger internal capacity to monitor and produce information, including a broader repertory of transmission strategies, should be expected to have higher access. About coalition formation, interest groups that decide to establish and join a coalition did so first and foremost due to shared preferences, but also due to important background factors such as the issue context and previous collaboration. However, in the order to maintain the coalition, it should be expected that a formal coalition design together with benefits of remaining inside the coalition, can facilitate intra-group coherence.

4 Method

4.1 Research Design

The research questions of the study are as follows:

1. What kind of "access goods" did the European associations supply to the Commission before the EED proposal, and what strategies did they employ to do so?
2. Why did some of the Euro-federations establish a coalition to promote energy efficiency, and how did they aggregate a joint advocacy position among them?

This study is preoccupied with the access goods Euro-federations supplied to the Commission during the pre-legislative phase of the EED. Access to policy makers is thought to be a general condition for influence in the EU system (Bouwen 2002: 366; Gullberg 2011). This is also a study of one particular instance of coalition building between Euro-federations. The conditions under which circumstances interest groups decide to collaborate will be identified and explained against theory and findings from earlier studies. The qualitative approach was employed in studying coalition building because of its benefits over a quantitative approach. Namely, with little information about the process of intra-group collaboration available, it was necessary to talk to the people involved in the coalition building process from the beginning. In the context of US politics Hojnacki (1997; 1998) examines interest groups coalition involvement through quantitative surveys across different policy domains. However, unlike in US politics, there is less data, theory and evidence available with respect to European interest groups, which are generally less induced to form coalitions than their American counterparts. Since such actors constellations are believed to occur seldom at the EU stage, an exploratory approach by asking open-ended questions is necessary (Bryman 2004; Leech 2002). In order to examine the causal process behind interest groups' decisions' to engage in formal coalition building, covering the different steps of cooperation to provide detailed historical explanation requires a qualitative approach.

Despite the problems attached to studying access as an indicator for influence, other alternatives are not more promising (Dür 2008a; 2008b). Other approaches such as both measuring preference attainment and conducting a survey have their difficulties (Dür 2008a). Determining interest groups' relative preferences attainment by studying documents such as position papers or consultation hearings (see for instance Tingaard Svendsen and Markussen 2005) has a limited inference drawing potential, since the actual policy process is not studied. This method also only looks at one possible lobbying strategy (to issue a written position) and not at other channels which groups might utilize to get access. Also, attempting to measure interest groups' preference on a proposal by making a survey of the involved parties would risk problems of positive or negative self-representation where influence is either exaggerated or lessened (Dür 2008a: 566 – 567). A survey would also be practically difficult due to the low amount of Euro-federations that have specialized competence in energy efficiency. Therefore, since the study of informational lobbying by interest groups in conjunction with other advocacy strategies has been understudied (Chalmers 2013a: 43), a more circumstantial examination should amplify their different claims when concentrating upon the informational supply be undertaken. In order to investigate the research questions, a qualitative strategy through interviews supported by documents and web sources was therefore chosen.

4.2 Choosing Case Formats

John Gerring defines a case study as "the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)" (2007: 20). Studying one event intensively should provide explanations to the broader class of events from which it is drawn. To answer the two research questions about the Euro-federations approach to the EED during the pre-legislative stage of the policy process, a more exploratory approach is taken instead of theory testing. To be able to test theories, a coherent theoretical framework has already to be presupposed (George and Bennett 2005: 115). Gerring (2007: 39 – 42) emphasizes that the strength of case studies lies in developing concepts and contributing to theory, rather than attempting to draw inferences with claim to generalizations. Access goods supply to the Commission and the formal position building of European interest groups have been understudied. Also, studies on information supply by interest groups have not focused on their capabilities to gather information through monitoring policy developments and research strategies, the exception being Chalmers articles (2011; 2013). This study will

therefore try to explore whether better monitoring policy developments and information gathering by interest groups together with their information transmission strategies, do increase access to the Commission.

Also due to the little body of research on coalition building among Euro-federations, this case study will remain explorative and hypothesis-generating, but it shall be based on earlier research on coalition formation as the point of departure. This is however not contradictory, as George and Bennett states that the search observations can be theory laden, "but doesn`t mean that they are theory determined" (2005: 21 – 22). Explorative studies have to clarify in advance what is to be explored, either on the basis of empirical evidence or assumed causal relationships (George and Bennett 2005: 111 – 112). This approach is recognized by Hojnacki which underlines the importance of the context of when and why interest groups decide to join coalitions due to the specific nature of the issue (1997: 80). As there are two aspects of interest groups advocacy efforts in the study, namely access goods provision and coalition building, the study takes a heuristic and theory-building approach through investigating different causes for what facilitates access to the Commission, and under what conditions interest groups decides to build a coalition. The study will thus attempt to identify causal mechanisms from an empirical case study that theory can be built on further (George and Bennett 2005: 111).

Some authors consider that the goal of case studies should be primarily to test the causal effects of variables on a single outcome, since this can simply the inference drawing potential of a study (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). However, the purpose of case studies could also be to discover under what circumstances and through which mechanisms a specific event occurs (George and Bennett 2005: 31). But from studying only one single instance of coalition formation, drawing any conclusive generalizations might be "premature" (Pijneburg 1998: 317). Also, earlier research has noted that problems arise when drawing general inferences from lobbyism through ad-hoc coalitions (Warleigh 2000). This is in line with the recommendations by Hojacnki et.al. (2012), since because of the few studies done on coalition formation between interest groups, the causes should mainly be seen as "suggestive". The provision of access goods and participating in networks don't have to be independent of each other, since the informational supply of interest groups also depends on its capabilities to monitor policy developments (Chalmers 2011). The ability to gather

information by interest groups can therefore be interrelated with collaboration, since interest groups can cooperate in order to produce access goods more efficiently. Interest groups' provision of information to decision makers does not have to be a solitary pursuit: after all, interest groups do not "operate in a vacuum" (Hula 1999: 120). Since energy efficiency is a relatively new area to be brought up at the EU level as well as technically demanding, interest groups that want to provide access goods to the Commission would do well in cooperating with each other. In the case of the EED, many informants reported that a high degree of their advocacy efforts went to collaborating, into what was later became a formally adopted coalition called the Coalition for Energy Savings. The context in which the various advocates lobbied must therefore be paid attention to. A process tracing approach is necessary to explain these new actor constellations by clarifying the historical series of events leading up to the specific outcome of coalition formation (George and Bennett 2005: 206 – 207). A problem with undertaking process tracing studies is to decide on a type of process tracing that fits with the phenomena of interest (George and Bennett 2005: 213). The format of this study can be seen as an "analytical explanation". Within it, a historical narrative is explained after some tentative expectations according to the factors that are assumed to be conditions for coalition building (George and Bennett 2005: 211). Since the factors contributing to coalition building can probably co-vary (previous collaborative behavior and issue context) identifying any clear variables to test can be problematic. Nevertheless, some tentative explanations related to the organizational characteristics and the nature of the issue was set forth in theory section.

4.3 A Representative Sample of Interest Groups?

A general problem when conducting case studies is to determine the class of events from which it is drawn, and thereby establish its representativeness (Gerring 2007). This is broadly a case study of information supply towards the Commission and interaction between interest groups during the pre-legislative stage of the EED. The unit of analysis in the study can thus be said to be the Euro-federation, whereas the coalition building aspect refers to a historical outcome of establishing cooperation between different Euro-federations. Choosing which units to draw from the larger population of interest groups was done strategically to answer both aspects satisfactorily. When conducting small-N research, it is important that the sample selection is done carefully and guided in order to avoid sample bias (Gerring 2007; Levy 2008: 8). On balance, the final interest groups sample in the study can be said to be relevant,

as the major business organizations and different stakeholders in the EED are represented, although there is a slight overrepresentation of interest groups from the building and construction industry. Many of these Euro-federations included in the sample were also the most active suppliers of information in terms of producing policy research and participating in the Commissions consultation and issuing position papers.

Interest groups included in the sample are eight different peak organizations from relevant sectors to energy efficiency, as well as two representatives from the Coalition for Energy Savings, which is the formal organization of interest groups collaborated in. The sample is balanced on the business side by actors from the building and construction industry: FIEC (European Construction Industry Federation), Eurima (European Insulation Manufacturers Association) and EuroACE (The European Alliance of Companies for Energy Efficiency in Buildings), energy and supply: The Union of the Electricity Industry (Eurelectric), appliance manufacturers: European Engineering Industries Association (Orgalime), and general enterprise and industry: Confederation of European Business (Businesseurope). From the civil society, representatives from World Wide Fund for Nature European Policy Office (WWF-EPO) and Climate Action Network (CAN-E) were interviewed. Four of the mentioned groups were members of the Coalition for Energy Savings (WWF-EPO, CAN-E, Eurima and EuroACE), while Businesseurope, Eurelectric, Orgalime, and FIEC were not. The divisions of interest groups constituencies are not entirely clear, as some of the groups have overlapping membership (for instance same companies inside Eurima and EuroACE). WWF-EPO is also a part of CAN-E, as the latter organization is a broader network for NGOs that work on climate issues.

Attaining a representative sample of interest groups in lobbying towards the Commission was a challenge. Regarding sectors and important stakeholders not included in the study, many interest groups did not reply to inquiries or declined interviews. Among other NGOs that were prominent in energy efficiency under the “Green 10” umbrella, Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) did not respond to my emails, neither did the European Council for Energy Efficient Economy (Eceee). Other environmental NGOs were not contacted, since very few apart from the already mentioned were active in issuing position papers or participated in the Commission consultation. Concerning public interest groups, neither consumer

organizations[11] nor the organization for social housing (The European Liaison Committee for Social Housing - Cecodhas), replied to my emails. Other organizations such as labor interest and local governments were not of primary concern to the study, as their position papers revealed having secondary objectives compared to the energy efficiency targets and the overall policy design. For energy suppliers and distributors, The European Association for the Promotion of Cogeneration (COGEN- Europe) was not contacted, since their interest base (Combined Heat and Power production – CHP) constitutes a narrow part of the larger EED framework. Their position papers are also narrower in scope by being only concerned with CHP-production, and not the overarching policy framework for energy efficiency (COGEN Europe 2013). The position of ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) EED considers mostly transmission of energy and is not preoccupied with binding energy efficiency targets or energy efficiency obligations (ENTSO-E Position Paper). Their position paper on the ENTSO-E stated through email correspondence that it was not involved during the agenda-setting stage of the EED. Other interest groups in energy supply such as CEDEC (European Federation of Local Energy Companies) did not reply to inquiries. Other interest groups involved in equipment manufacture such as CECED (The European Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturer) did not participate in the Commissions consultation hearing was therefore not included. Among business and enterprise, UEAPME **(**European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) were active in issuing position papers and consultations, but stated through correspondence not to have been active in the build-up phase of the Directive. Among other associations contacted within the building sector, associations such as eu.ESCO (European Association of Energy Service Companies) and eu.BAC (European Building Automation and Controls Association) did not respond to emails, while a convenient interview occasion for Polythane-Insulation Europe (PU-Europe) could not be found. Energy intensive industries were overall less active in issuing position papers and participating in consultations. This might be because most of their relevant improvements in energy efficiency in the energy intensive industry have already been heavily implemented to reduce their energy costs (Euractiv 2012). Among those energy intensive organizations that issued position papers on the EED, neither Glass for Europe nor CEPI (Confederation of European Paper Industries) replied to my emails or phone

[11] Public consumer groups are as The European Consumer Organization (BEUC) and EUROCOOP (European Community of Consumer Cooperatives). One of the mentioned organizations confessed through email-correspondence that it didn't have the capacity to follow the policy process.

calls. This was unfortunate as especially Glass for Europe would be an interesting stakeholder due to also representing the building industry as well.

4.4 Data Collection: the Semi-Structured Elite-interview and Method Triangulation

In order to answer relevant research questions, the data to do so can come from many sources (Yin 2009: 99). This section will outline the different approaches to how data was collected. This study relies mainly on interviews, with support from other secondary sources such as research studies, position papers and web sources.

Before discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the collected data, the interview format best suited for the research questions should be specified. The format of the interview must be "tailored" depending on what type of information which is sought (Aberbach and Rochman 2005: 673). Interviews have been described as ranging from a continuum between an open conversation between the interviewer and the informant, to close where a set of questions are predefined and cannot be amended (Bryman 2004). The semi-structured interview is somewhere in the middle: questions in the interview-guide are pre-defined, often with a mix of close and open-ended questions. The order of the questions can also be changed and follow-up questions may be asked (Leech 2002; Bryman 2004: 121). This form was most appropriate in order to undertake the interview, since much about energy efficiency politics and policy developments in the field was unknown to the author. Maintaining enough flexibility to ask follow-up questions during the interview situation was thus pivotal. Henceforth, by being flexible in following the interview guide and opening for the possibility to "probe" on questions underway, it is possible to get more exhaustive answers (Berry 2002; Andersen 2006). To this end, the interview guide was developed with a clear defined order of both closed- and open-ended questions. The motivation for balancing the fixed and open types of questions was to maintain both the reliability and the precision which structured interviews can provide, together with the in-depth knowledge and new information which the unstructured interview potentially offers (Leech 2002). Although few informants were able to answer in substantive detail on all questions, it was nevertheless necessary to try gauging the informants' responses, especially those related to contact access and contact frequency to the Commission. In addition, with little prior knowledge about the interest groups strategies, it

was necessary to be able to formulate open ended question around this policy matter. Moreover, the interviews can also be classified as "elite interviews" since the informants possess more information on the specific policy field and policy process than most other officials and citizens (Tansey 2007: 766). Especially for information about coalition building, it was necessary to contact policy brokers inside the Coalition for Energy Savings, since asking all the members of the group and cross-checking their answers would not be feasible given the time frame. Hence, those informants that functioned as "coalition brokers" were key informants in order to better answer the question of coalition formation, since they had been present through almost the whole policy development (Andersen 2006: 282). Finally, another important feature of the data collection process was that not all actors were identified in advance. To some extent, the study can be said to follow the "snowball method", since many informants gave advice to whom other it would be useful to schedule an interview with (Bryman 2004: 333 – 334). Some of the informants were thus contacted underway in the data collection procedure.

Also before sending out interview requests to interest groups, a document analysis of consultation hearings and position papers was undertaken in order to map the relevant stakeholders towards the EED. This was necessary to map the relevant actors, as well as helpful in order to determine every group's position with regard to binding targets and the design of policy instruments. This was done in order to map the various interest groups position, but also to "scan" the interest group sample for relevant informants and whom it would be useful to contact. Relying on written documents published by interest groups besides the interviews alone, was important in order to clarify what the different stakeholders' positions were. The document analysis was also coded in comparison with the Commission's proposal and the final directive version to decide whom that stood out as relative losers and winner from the policy process. This was useful in order to prepare for the interview situation to establish rapport more easily by knowing their preference attainment in advance. To further support the interview data, other sources such as research studies by different interest groups, press messages and news sources were analyzed in to better understand the development of the policy process and intra-group linkages. When undertaking a process tracing study, it is recommended to employ method triangulation to ensure that the reliability and internal validity is as high as possible (Checkel 2007; George and Bennett 2005). This is in accordance with methodological recommendations, namely to cross-check the information

from interviews with other sources (George and Bennett 2005; Checkel 2007). However, the major sources of information in the early phase of the Coalition for Energy Savings are interviews from all the involved parties. It would however have been desirable to have the causal process towards coalition building verified by more sources. However, there were also a limited number of persons that were present through the whole coalition building process. Those who served as coalition brokers were therefore of particular importance.

Prior to the data collection, the research project was notified and accepted by the Norwegian Social Sciences Data Services (NSD). All interest groups were first contacted by a general email sent to their organizations secretariat with an interview request. If no answers from the relevant groups were received within ten days, a personal email was sent directly to the relevant person in each organization with an interview request. If no reply was then received, interest groups were contacted directly by phone. A couple of days before each interview were scheduled, an outline of the questions was sent to the informants. This was useful to prepare them for the interview as well as help them to recall the process before the Commission's proposal. Although the policy process in question was not too late back in time, (approximately two till three years), it is generally considered helpful to refresh the informants memory in advance. This can contribute to increase the reliability of the study (Andersen 2006). All of the respondents did approve to be named in the study (see appendix I for exhaustive list). Since questions regarding lobby strategies can be perceived to be sensitive, informants were promised not to be linked to any quote directly, including asked to approve the anonymous quotes used in the analysis. All of the interviews were undertaken in Brussels over two different time periods, apart from the interview with Businesseurope and the Coalition for Energy Savings Secretary General, which was carried out by phone. All the interviews were recorded and later accurately transcribed. Field notes were written after each single interview, describing and evaluating the interview situation, as well as points of special importance and to whom it also would be interesting to contact further.

4.5 Reliability, Validity and Challenges Towards the Research Design

The problem of reliability is a central critical aspect in employing case studies as a research design (Bryman 2004; George and Bennett 2005). Reliability implies that when applying the

same procedure, other researchers should be able to repeat the findings (Yin 2009: 45). Hence, the degree of reliability in the study is the ability of other researchers to reproduce the same result. This often meets difficulties in practice, since the interview situation can hardly be recreated. But, it should be possible to replicate the findings from the collected data such as interview transcripts. The interview guide and the classifications obtained through coding are therefore of importance in securing reliability. There are also other potential threats to reliability specific to conducting semi-structured interviews - namely, that the interviewer will have to frequently deviate from the interview guide (Bryman 2004). Nevertheless, this can be perceived as general trade-off as Leech (2002: 665) prescribes, one might attain a high reliability due to standardization of the interview, but low validity due to the little degree of securing better content through open questions. The reliability of data can generally be enhanced if it is supported by other sources (George and Bennett 2005).

In this study, reliability was increased by transcribing every single interview and verifying the content with other sources such as issued research material, calendar of events, old press messages and general communication by the interest groups where possible. As such, cross checking the process of the coalition building between the informants and public sources was necessary. Considering internal documents from the Coalition for Energy Savings, I did ask for a list of landmarks from the secretariat, but was not able to retrieve them. Not getting hold of internal documents such as meetings agendas etc. from the early coalition building phase should not however be a caveat towards the reliability and validity of the study, since the informants who described the build-up process would generally tell the same story. The potential amount of information missed from not having internal documents was not crucial to the study, as much of the cooperation in the beginning was little institutionalized. Another threat to reliability was that some of the respondents from interest groups had changed jobs or could not remember the whole process in the desired amount of detail through all levels of cooperation.

A threat towards the validity of the study concerns whether measured access to decision-makers in an informal manner such as through non-institutionalized channels of lobbying (Gullberg 2008a: 2965). One informant underscored that since Brussels is a rather small in

terms of specialized interest in energy and climate politics, one would often meet people at informal places. Omission to ask for access through informal channels or even longer-lasting personal ties could thus be a problem and threaten the validity of the study.

Another general problem of conducting interview is positive self-representation (Berry 2002). This might also be a problem since lobbyists can be susceptible to exaggerate their own influence (Dür2008a), for instance by claiming to have higher access than the fact. This did not seem the case. Another complicated factor that relates both to the reliability and the validity of the study, concerns the informants' anonymity. Anonymizing the informants can be attractive in order to secure better responses from the informants and thereby improve the validity of the study by securing better responses. However, this might exacerbate the reliability of the study through reduced transparency. In this case, all informants approved to be mentioned by name (see appendix II for exhaustive list). When there are generally few people that were involved such as those who were central interest groups coordinators, it might be not purposeful to grant informants interview, as the relevant people in the energy efficiency domain are rather few. Hence, those who took a coordinating function could easily be recognized nevertheless. Since all of the informants approved disclosure, it was pivotal to ask them to approve citations in advance. This was helpful to solve potential misunderstandings and to clarify the process of action with regard to coalition building.

5 Analysis

5.1 General Access Patterns of Different Groups to the Commission

The access to the Commission between the various interest groups was uneven, both in terms of frequency and level of access. Some informants reported to have had frequent contact with DG Energy (which was responsible for the legislation) almost every week before the proposal, including before the energy efficiency action plan. Business groups reported to have overall more frequent access to the Commission than environmental groups. Among the business sector groups, EuroACE, Eurima and Eurelectric were those main organizations who reported to have the highest frequency of access before the Commissions proposal. This is not surprising as they were the stakeholders with the most immediate material incentives in the legislation. Other groups reported to have had contact with the Commission around one till three times a month in average. Many of the informants also reported that there had been, in the words of one of the representatives, a "dummy-run" towards the Commission to influence the preceding action plan for energy efficiency. This action plan was originally expected to be launched before the summer recess in 2010, but was delayed due to what some informants believed to be the Commissions the intra-service consultation. The reasons stated was that it was not certain how the implications of binding energy efficiency targets and/or measures could affect the carbon price (ETS). Since the time between the action plan and Commission`s proposal was only three months, the majority of groups had been concentrating their advocacy efforts towards the Commission earlier on the then anticipated action plan. Some of the interest groups were therefore just as active to influence the action plan, which contained many of the measures the Commission would propose in legislation. One of the informants stated that "I think most of the thinking was done for the action plan and then translated into the Directive". With regard to the political leadership of the Commission, the Cabinet was perceived by all informants to be less useful than desk officers. In the Commission, desk officers and policy officers were those which all of the interest groups considered to be most useful in having contact with. This supports earlier findings where interest groups are reported to be in more contact with lower level officials, than the political

leadership (Eising 2009: 140 – 141). Interest groups reported also to have less contact with senior officials such as heads of units, departments or General Secretary, than lower level staff that were working on the daily policy developments.

5.2 Applying the Model for Resource Exchange

As made account for in the theory section, interaction between interest groups and the Commission can be seen as an informational transaction between interdependent organizations (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009). Subsequent chapter will examine the Commissions need for information and the interest groups ability to supply it, to fully explain the provision of access goods. In section 5.3, the broader background of energy efficiency as a policy subsystem is described, before the expectations behind coalition formation and intra-group dynamics will be explained.

5.2.1 Theories of Information Demand

The information requested by Commission from interest groups can be divided into a category of technical know-how and political information. Almost every group stated that the Commission was in demand for expert knowledge (EK). The shared view among most of the groups is that the Commission mainly needed expertise on the regulation of the building sector for energy efficiency policies. This is confirmed by other interest groups that were not major providers of such information. That expert knowledge was in highest demand is therefore as anticipated from Bouwens theory. One informant stated as following:

"Before the proposal, the Commission was looking more for technical expertise from all stakeholders (…) as an umbrella organization; we are not always in the best position to provide very technical input".

Although some informants underlined that the level of complicatedness regarding energy efficiency is not so high compared to other policy areas, most of the information that was supplied, had the scope to demonstrate that achieving the 20 percent target (or more) for energy efficiency was politically feasible. The knowledge provision was mainly related to how the 20 percent target could be met, the design of the policy instruments designated to be

included and the regulation of the European building stock[12]. Being contacted directly for information by the Commission, can be a suitable indicator for having relevant EK. EuroACE, Eurima and Eurelectric were the only ones that reported to have been requested for information directly. In order to provide information upon request, the response time was in general estimated to be within three to five working days, although one would generally try to do so as fast as possible. The ability to provide information quick at the Commissions request can improve the standing of a group which thereby gives it an "insider" status. Those groups that were contacted directly were the major knowledge providers, although the frequency and level of EK output, was highest among EuroACE and Eurima. Thus having relevant information which the Commission needed would facilitate more frequent access for these groups. It is not surprising that the building sector were the central information suppliers, since their members have a natural competence and ownership to the policy area where information was needed.

About the European Encompassing Interest, all groups had produced an aggregated policy position of their members and issued position papers about it, except for FIEC that were not able to agree on a strong position. The aggregated policy message of the different Euro-federations can be seen as the EEI. However, the relevance of supplied EEI was less important to the Commission than EK, as the Commission could more easily find out interest groups position through consultation hearings and position papers. Since it should remain a political neutral body, the Commission would also seldom ask groups directly about their policy positions. Most interest groups would often refer to their position papers for their policy messages and what they perceived to be politically desirable. However, demonstrating that a political position is also feasible requires the additional provision of EK. Those groups who were not active research suppliers stated that they concentrated most upon general policy messages (EEI) and to what extent they could support the proposal, both with regard to binding targets and the design of policy instruments. Findings support the anticipated hierarchy of political information, as none of the groups reported to been requested about information about domestic actors. Before the launch of the EED proposal, the Commission

[12] One group formulated their technical expertise needed by the Commission like this: "How many buildings, what buildings type should we target, is it possible to regulate the European buildings sector, is it possible to regulate the private sector for public buildings, should the target be a number or a percentage etc."

would have direct discussions with the member states, according to most of the informants. The political information the Commission demanded was thus EEI, which is the main access good European federations can provide (Bouwen 2002). Overall, Bouwen`s predictions on the hierarchy of demanded information (EK, EEI, DEI) are supported by the findings.

5.2.2 Interest Groups Supply of Access Goods

This chapter is disposed as follows: First, the general level of supply of information by the interest groups to the Commission will be covered. Thereafter, the information transmission strategies groups employed to supply the Commission will be described. Then, the overall production of access goods is elaborated for each interest group in the study divided along their sectorial affinity.

As stated in chapter 3.2, interest groups ability to supply the Commission with information depends on their capacity to gather information through their daily "pre-advocacy" tasks: monitoring policy developments and strategies to produce policy relevant material (Chalmers 2011; 2013b). Not surprisingly, those groups that had higher capacities to gather information through policy monitoring and producing policy research enjoyed a higher access to the Commission. Also, those interest groups that were involved in different networks did have a higher informational output. About the capacity for policy monitoring, those interest groups that were involved in different networks and fora did have a higher informational output. However, those groups that were most "networked" over the EED did so mostly to share information and build joint positions and less often to produce "new" policy research. Participating in various networks can therefore increase groups' information production through better identifying what the informational demands are. About the various research strategies of interest groups, most would commission it to a third party such as a research institute or consultancies to produce relevant policy information. Those groups who could draw on their members' expertise would do so, but no interest groups reported to have produced major research studies in-house. Those interest groups with the highest supply policy relevant information were especially those from the building sector[13] (Eurima and EuroACE).But the interest groups abilities to produce access goods were not only related to

[13] See web sources in literature list for exenstive research production.

gather information, but also their organizational structure for aggregating a policy stance. Those interest groups who were faster in presenting an aggregated position, also got higher overall access. A slow internal decision making process can thereby hamper the effective provision of access goods (Bouwen 2004), and especially the provision of EEI. Those interest groups that were relatively quick to aggregate a joint position before the Commission proposal did also achieve higher access. This generally favors group that have a faster (often majoritarian) decision-making structure, than for instance a consensual one. Having a consensual structure where an aggregate position has to be agreed upon almost anonymously could delay the groups' ability to supply EEI especially. This is however more critical for business groups than purposive groups. One nuance is also ought to be made. Not all interest groups were mainly preoccupied with producing information to supply the Commission as such. Especially environmental NGOs were active in forming a common stance with other business actors than producing information with the aim to lobby, particularly from the building sector, but also research institutes. The process of intra-group cooperation so will be further explained in section 5.3.

Information transmission and lobby strategies

Gaining access to decision makers does not only depend on the general openness of the channel, but also how groups employ their resources to do so (Gullberg 2011). Having special policy information can be one important factor as such, but there are other aspects related to strategies for informational transmissions. Those interest groups that had a more diversified approach to submit information did get higher access. Producing research material which was demanded, gives also an increased leverage on how to deliver the information. When supplying expert knowledge, this could open additional access channels besides having regular contact with decision-makers personally or through correspondence. Organizing different types of events seemed to be the preferred way to deliver information. This could for instance be organizing a conference or a workshop alone, or in cooperation with others through a campaign or coalition. As such, they had a regular access, but in order to make the provisions of expert information itself more effective, it could be more confined to larger occasions. One informant formulated it as follows:

"I think it is really important (…) to have moments in the year where, at least one per year, where you can say and now here, "boom" here is the big new piece of new information that we contributed to or put together ourselves".

Those groups that had a predefined approach to producing demanded information would also employ such channels most frequently. Some of the informants reported that hosting a workshop was conceived to be the most useful approach, since it could enable a discussion with specialists with member of ones own group, different EU decision makers and sometimes national government representatives in order to discuss the policy subject in the same room for a day or two. One informant thus stated:

" (…) it could be bringing particularly key players together to the Commission, to make them sit together in a room etc. and we do a lot of action on that front (…). [In hosting workshops?] Yeah, in hosting workshops. (…). We do host workshops on the European level here in Brussels (…). It is a very powerful tool, and it works (…).

Some nuances about the differences between "insider" and "voice" strategy is required, as findings in this study shows that some groups would employ both strategies to influence legislation. Instead of perceiving use of "voice" as a subsidiary lobby strategy secondary to an "insider" strategy, those groups that engaged in a campaign saw it as complimentary. It is not clear whether outsourcing "voice" to a coalition or a campaign can improve access to the Commission directly, but it shows that using an "insider" and "outsider" approach does not have to be mutually exclusive. Business groups would however not make "noise" on issues alone, but not singlehandedly; most often through campaigns or a network. However, there is not enough evidence in collected data to determine whether having outsider strategy would increase access to the Commission itself, apart from the gathering of information.

Insulation producers and building sector groups

This section covers interest groups that are stakeholder in terms of energy efficiency in buildings and the construction industry, namely Eurima, EuroACE and FIEC. Eurima represents the interests of insulation and mineral wool producers throughout Europe. They have therefore an immediate material stake in increased renovation of the building stock. EuroACE consists of companies involved in production of equipment, distribution, and energy savings controls and installations. The policy objectives of Eurima and EuroACE are also to a high degree similar; they were both active in advancing the need for 3 percent renovation of the public building stock, and by advocating long term roadmaps for building

renovation by the member states (EuroACE 2011; Eurima 2011). For Eurima and EuroACE, energy efficiency obligations was of secondary importance than immediate building renovation, in terms of policy instruments but became more important later during the negotiation process of the EED. FIEC consists of national member associations in the construction industry and was little involved towards the Commission before the legal proposal, instead concentrating the resources on the implementation of the EBPD (Interview FIEC). This was because the scope of the EED did not correspond to the core building activities of members, although they were in favour of creating a market for energy savings in the long run. In addition, some of FIECs member federations could not agree on supporting the three percent rate of public building renovation as they felt this was a clear breach of subsidiarity, and could therefore not advocate a strong position (Interview FIEC). FIEC also emphasized that policy instruments to trigger building renovation have to be directed towards incentivising building owners to invest in energy saving measures instead of only targeting energy suppliers.

In terms of monitoring, both Eurima and EuroACE were present and active in different fora. There had earlier been informal work between European associations in the energy efficiency domain through the Energy Efficiency Industrial Forum (EEIF[14]). EEIFs objectives are to make EUs targets for energy saving mandatory, secure more ambitious legislation within energy efficiency and to promote better support for financial mechanisms (EuroACE 2013). Since the cooperation started around 2008, interest groups with a stake in energy efficiency had already begun cooperating on the EPBD. There has also been increasing cooperation between different actors within the building and construction sector through a campaign called Renovate Europe, headed by EuroACE. The campaign was launched to promote the renovation of EUs building stock in order to reach its climate targets, as well as to restart the construction sector after the financial crisis (Renovate Europe 2013). The campaigns main objectives are to reduce the energy consumption by 80 percent of Europe`s building stock in 2050, compared to the 2005 level (Renovate Europe 2013). Renovate Europe works by gathering and sharing information among its partners, communicated messages, as well as

[14] The forum was established in 2008 and members apart from Eurima and EuroAce, include European Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturers (CECED, COGEN Europe, European Copper Institute, ELC, Glass for Europe, PU-Europe (EuroAce).

hosting different events (Interview EuroACE). With participation through different fora such as the Coalition for Energy Savings, EEIF and Renovate Europe, it is plausible that both EuroACE and Eurima had a higher capacity for monitoring relevant policy developments, as well as gathering more information through cooperation with other partners. Both EuroACE and Eurima did report not to produce much of their supplied expert information in-house, but were instead active in cooperation with research institutes or paid consultancies. EuroACE contributed to study with the Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE) in 2011 which was the first report on the energy consumption of buildings in Europe assessed on country by country basis[15]. Also before the EED proposal, EuroACE cooperated in producing two other research publications with other partners[16]. Eurima engaged early in producing policy relevant information by undertaking joint studies with the research institute Ecofys and independent consultants, as well as drawing on their members' expertise (Interview Eurima). The broader policy messages of Eurima and EuroACE were confined to general position papers and making a common stance with other groups. Both Eurima and EuroACE were also actively involved in their coordination efforts within the Coalition for Energy Savings in order to establish joint positions.

Environmental NGOs

Environmental NGOs have established a tradition for working together under the "Green 10" umbrella (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Among the different NGOs in the "Green 10", WWF-EPO, is considered to be the best endowed with an approximate 13 percent of their budget from the EU institutions and around 41 staff (Greenwood 2011: 16). These NGOs are widely considered to be efficient in agenda setting on issues that has not been fully developed yet (Long and Lörinczi 2009: 176 – 177; Greenwood 2011: 146). CAN-E is a specialized group within the "Green 10" umbrella that was established in Brussels in the early 1990s (Long and Lörinczi 2009: 171). CAN-E functions as an overarching network where other NGOs are members, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth-Europe (FoEE), including WWF-EPO. The representative from CAN-E mainly worked together with the policy officers from the other environmental NGOs to coordinate their advocacy efforts, as well as inside the

[15] The rapport by the BPIE was the first study undertaken to map the EUs building stock and presented forecasts for the energy saving potential of the energy performance potential in European buildings renovation by 2050.

[16] See section 7.2 about web literature for exhaustive list.

Coalition for Energy Savings. The environmental NGOs were early promoting the need for a binding energy efficiency target and a more ambitious regulatory framework. Especially WWF-EPO advanced the need of ambitious legislation in suggesting to make a connection between energy efficiency obligations and deep renovation of buildings (Interview WWF-EPO; WWF-EPO 2013). Also, a major part of WWF-EPOs advocacy efforts were done in coordination with other groups, especially alongside CAN-E and the Coalition for Energy Savings (Interview WWF-EPO; CAN-E). Both NGOs reported to produce little expert information within their organization, whereas WWF-EPO would rely on WWF national offices for specific information (Interview WWF-EPO), CAN-E concentrated on the joint advocacy and coordination. WWF-EPO and CAN-E had also less contact with the Commission compared to other business organizations. Most of the efforts to enhance their positions where done in collaboration with others. The types of information issued from WWF-EPO and CAN-E were broadly confined to policy recommendations (EEI). However, CAN-E was active in producing research based policy information in cooperation with other business organizations from the building sector, where the cooperation later to became a more formalized as the Coalition for Energy Savings. Through participation in both a homogenous network ("Green 10") and heterogeneous network (Coalition for Energy Savings), they can be said to have a high monitoring activity to follow policy developments, but did not engage actively in producing policy research material independently. Also, both groups were early advancing the need for 20 percent binding energy efficiency targets and concomitant stronger legislation.

Energy Suppliers and transmitters

The most relevant lobby segments for energy supply and transmission in energy efficiency are Eurelectric (the Union of the Electricity Industry), ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) and COGEN Europe (The European Association for the Promotion of Cogeneration). Eurelectric represents the national associations of European utility companies, but has also direct company membership. Since the members of Eurelectric work directly in the market where energy efficiency obligations have to performed, they should be expected to possess expert information on the design of this policy instrument. Eurlectric dissented with the Commissions proposal both with the regard to binding energy efficiency targets and obligations. Reasons stated for disagreeing on the energy efficiency obligations is due to making energy suppliers responsible for their

customers' savings without any legislation on the consumers themselves (Interview Eurelectric; Eurlectric 2011). Eurlectric also dissented on how the binding targets are expressed, as measuring the energy savings in Mtoe necessarily lead to a problematic calculation of fuel conversion when energy savings are to be counted. For Eurlectric, the lobbying process towards the Commission over the EED was the most complex one in recent years, although contact with the Commission was reported to be fairly frequent (Interview Eurelectric). The differences between Eurlectrics preferences and the Commission proposal can be seen over the role of EEOs in contrast with increased flexibility over the policy design and stronger regulation directed towards the energy consumers (Eurelectric 2011). Eurelectric does not tend to join coalition, but work in alignment with other interest groups to share information. Regarding information provision, Eurelectric would usually concentrate on the broader policy recommendations while deploying the technical competencies of their members (Interview Eurelectric). Regarding information transmission, Eurelectric hosted one workshop on the energy efficiency obligations scheme after the Commission proposal later in March 2012.

Enterprise, manufacturers and other industries

The business, enterprise and industry sector in this study is mainly represented by the two peak organizations Businesseurope (Confederation of European Business) and Orgalime (European Engineering Industries Association). Businesseurope is the main body of European industrial and employers' organization and has mainly national federations as members. Businesseurope`s position paper and consultation hearings are ambiguous towards energy efficiency targets and instruments. Businesseurope dissented with the Commission on the need for having an absolute target on energy efficiency consumption (interview Businesseurope). Also for Businesseurope, the main concern is that the target of energy savings should not be expressed in absoulute terms, while more flexibility provisions such as early action counting in the energy efficiency obligations would be better (Businesseurope 2011). Businesseurope was also not convinced about the necessity to have strong legislation on energy efficiency, as businesses can attain savings themselves without binding legislation. Normally, Businesseurope based their discussions towards a position mainly on experts from member federations and companies. Businesseurope did not coordinated their action formally with other groups on the EED, but has had dialogue with other stakeholders, both those who agreed and disagreed on their stance. Businesseurope did not engage in independent policy

research to supply the Commission with information, but sometimes draw in their members' expertise (Interview Businesseurope). Usually, Businesseurope would instead concentrate on the broader policy messages of their members (EEI).

For stakeholders among product manufacturers Orgalime consists mainly of national associations in the mechanical, electronic and metalworking sectors of European countries, as well as smaller Euro-federations. As a stakeholder within energy efficiency, Orgalime is a technology provider in producing equipment and appliances from energy efficiency light bulbs to dishwashers. Orgalime was also in favor of binding 20 percent energy efficiency target and concomitant legislation. Orgalime works by consensus where members are included in working groups to aggregate a position. Orgalimes information production was generally focused on policy messages rather than on technical information. However, since their main advocacy efforts were done towards the key actors in the EP (Interview Orgalime), and their position papers were published fairly late, that the process of aggregating a joint position seems to have been slow and prolonged. Orgalime tends to remain with coordinating a position internally instead of joining networks or other fora due to its very encompassing member base (Interview Orgalime). It policy research is this normally confined the concentrated policy messages of their sector (EEI).

5.3 Coalition Formation

This chapter is disposed according to the following outline: First, the process behind the formation of the Coalition for Energy Savings will be traced. Then different theoretical explanations for coalition building between the European associations will be set forth. In section 5.3.2, some remarks are made about what facilitates intra-group cohesion. Finally, the type of collective action from the Coalition for Energy Savings will be attempted described and compared to other coalition models. Finally, attention will be given to what extent the coalition constitutes an independent entity, and especially discussed what has been called mobilizing a "constituency of support" in the EU context of coalitions and networks (Richardson 1996; Burns and Carson 2011: 146).

5.3.1 Interest Group Interaction and Coalition Building

After the adoption of the European Performance of Buildings Directive recast in 2010, it was widely anticipated among interest groups that one Directive addressing energy efficiency in the existing building stock was forthcoming. As stated in section 5.1, the Commission`s action plan for energy efficiency was awaited before the summer recess 2010, but was postponed till March 2011 due to the Commissions inter-service consultation. This is also within the time interval where the groups undertook most of their formative coalitional work. There had been limited advocacy and attention given to the field of energy efficiency by environmental groups on energy efficiency up till the years 2009 – 2010, apart from on the review on the EPBD (Interview CAN-E). In the years 2009 and 2010, discussion started among environmental NGOs and with other Euro-federation on a regular basis how energy efficiency at the EU level should be promoted further. WWF-EPO and other NGOs had already started working together on the recast of the Eco-Design Directive in 2009 by calling for increased energy efficiency performance of appliances through a campaign called "Coolproducts" (Interview Matthieu Ballu). One of the campaign`s main targets was to try pushing the Commission for a stronger regulatory framework for energy efficiency in appliances (Coolproducts 2013). The status of energy efficiency and especially the need for binding energy efficiency targets was then further taken up by environmental NGOs and the think-thank European Climate Foundation (ECF) when the Commission was preparing the energy efficiency action plan for the EED. The cooperation between NGOs on the Eco-Design Directive led to further joint activity with a published a manifesto on energy efficiency in buildings, including a call for making the target of 20 percent energy efficiency target in the EU binding (Interview Matthieu Ballu; EPE 2010). The increased cooperation between interest groups which shared an environmental concern started seeking out partners for cooperation on energy efficiency with the building industry and producers of domestic appliances (Interview Matthieu Ballu). This was also verified by informants from other interest groups that were not actively engaged in the status of energy efficiency at that time. One stated as following: "And suddenly, what happened 2010, all these actors came on to the scene".

Beginning in the year 2009, environmental NGOs such as CAN-E and WWF-EPO started to work with ECF and private consultants on how the 20 percent energy efficiency target could be delivered. Different actors from environmental groups, think-tanks, research institutes, the

building sector and private consultancies cooperated in producing a study called "Energy Savings 2020" which was published the summer 2010 (ECOFYS 2010). The study mapped out how EUs energy efficiency policy could be designed in order to meet the 2020 target. The study was also an answer to the need for information about how energy savings could be attained and was well-referred to by the Commission in the action plan for energy savings (Interview CAN-E). The different interest groups involved in the "Energy Savings 2020" study had together identified a common concern in regulation being needed and increased legislation to promote investments in energy efficiency (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). During this formative stage, the Coalition was promoting to make the 20 percent energy efficiency target legally binding by 2020 (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). This was already ongoing when the Commission's action plan for energy efficiency was developed, which later became the core work of the organization on the proposal for the Energy Efficiency Directive. The non-institutionalized cooperation between different actors over the research project "Energy Savings 2020" in 2010, led to further cooperation among the various associations in the steering group of the study. This cooperation was first a joint advocacy group (Interview Matthieu Ballu), from which the Coalition for Energy Savings sprung out from later[17]. An informal structure was established first whereby different members of the involved interest groups took on a function of acting as a secretariat and organized regular meetings (Interview Matthieu Ballu). From the initial advocacy group after the "Energy Savings 2020" study, a steering committee was later established to coordinate activities (Interview Matthieu Ballu).

The starting point for cooperation on the EED was a revision of the existing Energy Service Directive and building further measures to draft a shadow Directive to supply the Commission with (Interview Matthieu Ballu). The most relevant parts of the ESD were thus kept which the EED was further built on in order to draft a shadow Directive, with an early emphasis on how the binding 20 percent energy efficiency target could be delivered. That relates to what levels, format and monitoring mechanisms of the whole energy efficiency policy design (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Concerning policy instruments in the EED, the energy efficiency obligations were given main attention when the shadow Directive to the

[17] The founding organizations of the coalition were: Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE), CAN-Europe, Cecodhas, ClientEarth, Cogen Europe, European Copper Institute, Eceee, the EU Corporate Leaders' Group on Climate Change, Eurima, EuroACE, ECF, CECED, European Environmental Bureau (EEB), Glass for Europe, PU Europe, The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), The Architects' Council of Europe (ACE), The Climate Group, WWF-EPO (Euractiv 2010).

EED was drafted. The environmental NGOs were particularly concerned with the promotion of this instrument. Since the energy efficiency end-use was primarily addressed in Energy Service Directive from 2006, developing these policy instruments for utility end-use schemes became the second priority for the NGOs, after the general promotion of 20 percent energy efficiency targets.

Among the informants, earlier cooperation among the actors within both NGOs and the business side in their own networks was helpful to coordinate advocacy efforts and build positions. Groups within these networks would often synchronize their political positions to make sure that they were not contradicting each other. Among the NGOs, a longer tradition for cooperation under the CAN and "Green 10" umbrella had been established. The NGOs and think-tanks such as European Climate Foundation were primarily concerned with energy efficiency lagging behind the other domains in the energy and climate package, and renewable energy production in particular, where most of the technology providers have their own separate associations. Especially environmental NGOs identified the need for energy efficiency to have its own interest constituency, as there was comparatively little "push" for energy efficiency than in the renewable energy sector (WWF-EPO). Among interest groups from the business sector, it was important for the stakeholders with a material benefit in the EED to see that this window of opportunity was not missed (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Also European associations from industry and the building sector had been working together in the EEIF to make sure that the industry positions were coordinated and not contradicting each other (Interview EuroACE). The establishment of the EEIF in 2008 can perhaps be seen as the first step towards position building by the business actors from the building and industry side, as almost all of the European associations in this forum were foundational members of the Coalition for Energy Savings.

As cooperation evolved, involved association started developing the advocacy group into a more formal coalition with a secretariat to coordinate activities (Interview WWF-EPO). Building a cross-sectorial platform was deemed necessary due to scattered stakeholders within the energy efficiency domain (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). A joint position was established with a concomitant position paper, setting forth the necessary policy instruments in order to meet the 20 percent target (CAN-E). As such, the Coalition for Energy Savings became the only organization at the EU level that could present an opinion on all the

different instruments within the EED. The coalition was then later formalized in autumn 2011, although a high degree of informal cooperation and joint position making had begun earlier in 2010 (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Membership was also reserved only to European associations and no individual companies, and whereas new members had to be approved by the steering committee of the Coalition (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Entry to the Coalition also required a certain membership fee to pay for the organizational structure. From there, the Coalition for Energy Savings was formally adopted with the appointment of a private consultant as a general secretary and a secretariat with staff in September 2011 (Coalition for Energy Savings 2011b). As the structures became solidified underway, it was decided to establish a structure managed by a steering committee of twelve persons, with shared seats of representatives from industry, public interest groups and interest groups representing a profession (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Entrance of new members was also subject to approval by this committee. Under the steering committee, there are two separate sub-committees for advocacy and communication (Coalition for Energy Savings 2013). Most intra-group contact was reported to happen in these sub-committees with meetings around every other week. Although the important political decisions were taken by the steering committee, the membership between these and the sub-committees were overlapping and much of the advocacy effort took place in the committee for advocacy (Interview Matthieu Ballu).

Explanations for coalition building among European interest groups

The general characteristics of the member base show that the Coalition for Energy Savings contained mostly organizations with narrow interest domains and a high degree of specializations during the formative phase. Except for BPIE (research institute), RICS and ACE (professions group), Cecodhas is the only organization with national federations as member associations. There is also a high prominence of NGOs and stakeholders from the building industry within the Coalition. Contrasted with Mahoney`s findings where Euro-federations with an encompassing membership base was stated as a major reason for them not joining coalitions (2007a; 2008), the study show that those interest groups which had narrower membership bases and belongs to a clear defined “niche”, were in majority of the founding organizations of the Coalition for Energy Savings. Also by being smaller and perhaps having less of a grand “reputation” to defend, groups that have less need for self-differentiation could also be more inclined to enter a coalition (Mahoney 2007a; Mahoney 2008; Hula 1999: 95 – 97). Organizational resources do not appear to be an important factor

for groups to join a coalition. This is in line with Mahoney (2008), where evidence supports that organizations that are less endowed, are not more prone to join coalitions. This could be because coalitions also require resources from interest groups in terms of membership fee and available staff (Mahoney 2008). Since membership in the Coalition for Energy Savings was regulated according to a membership fee, this could indicate that the groups who joined are not among the least bestowed groups at the EU level. This section will set out the role of previous coalition behavior and cooperation in order to explain coalition building, as well as present the theoretical expectations pertaining to the issue context of the policy field.

Joining a coalition at an early stage is perceived to be of central importance to interest groups, since it can easier identify which other groups that are their potential partners and opponents (Hula 1999: 51, 93). Before an interest group can mobilize, it is useful to have information about which actors in the policy space they can cooperate with. Interest groups that have already established linkages to other groups through informal networks should therefore more easily be able to map out potential collaborators. Perhaps more importantly, interest groups that are familiar with position building with other groups should be expected to join a coalition. The previous behavior by most of the groups seems to be central in order to set up the coalition. Environmental NGOs have for a long time been cooperating under the "Green 10" umbrella, whereas actors from the business side with a stake in energy efficiency had previously worked in alignment, both in the EEIF and the Renovate Europe campaign. These are however examples of homogenous network (where the member base is similar) and not a heterogeneous[18] network like the Coalition for Energy Savings. Nevertheless, the evidence from this study is in accordance with earlier research that show those organizations who have previous experience with coalitions, are more prone to join one (Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999). It thus seems plausible that forging a larger coalition was easier between two different networks that were already well connected. In order for the Coalition for Energy Savings to develop, it could be in Hulas (1999: 109) words that: "coalitions come from those who are closest to themselves". Many of the groups were already "acquaint" in their own interest domain: for the business organization, both the EEIF and Renovate Europe had been in place to facilitate cooperation, and the NGOs have a longer tradition for working together under the "Green 10" umbrella. However, one point requires further elaboration, which is how interest

[18] Chalmers (2013b) refers to such networks as "homophilic" and "heterophilic".

groups from two different homogenous networks (such as "Green 10" and the EEIF) decided to collaborate together.

Networking could very well be the "habitual" way of working by environmental NGOs, which Warleighs (2000) findings indicate. Purposive groups are perceived to be effective in identifying and cooperating with other actors in order to advocate their stance (Warleigh 2000). As this case shows, the role of environmental NGOs was central to lift the status of energy efficiency and promote cooperation. The agenda-setting function of environmental NGOs is also relevant for the energy efficiency domain, where the NGOs often act as policy first movers (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Also, environmental NGOs would rather concentrate on advocacy efforts and seek out cooperation with partners to enhance their message (Warleigh 2000), than producing policy relevant information themselves. This can however also be reciprocal as corporate interest can seek out member-based organizations to advance their policy claims (Hojnacki 1997: 70). Informants involved in producing the joint report "Energy Savings 2020" would underscore how the earlier successful cooperation between different actors developed further into more formal channels. Organizational characteristics thus seems to be central in order to explain coalition building, first by groups in their own environment, and then by seeking out other interest groups with shared concern from another policy area. With regard to this, the early trust building part was deemed central, as many of the interest groups related to the building industry were perceived by some of the purposive groups as not having a primary environmental concern. One of the informants expressed the development of the relationship as follows:

"(…) the role of the individuals here in Brussels, the trust building is essential (…). The establishment of trust, knowing that the NGOs are not tree hugger lunatics, and the industry guys are not raving polluters, really played a role in discussions".

Organizational causes are however unsatisfactory to explain coalition formation alone. As stated in the theory section, earlier evidence on coalition building expects that when the policy content is complicated and actors' competencies are spread across the subsystem, cooperation emerges. This is what is believed to have happened in the context of American interest groups; increasing policy specialization can motivate interest groups to pursue coalition strategies (Hula 1999: 26, 123). This seems to be supported in the case of building

the Coalition for Energy Savings, since most of the participants are stakeholders across different parts of the energy efficiency domain. Also, the perceived opposition to energy efficiency was by some of the informants seen as prominent, and especially from the Council. The coalition was developed in a context of status quo orientation by leading member states with regard to energy efficiency, as a strong framework would require clear sources of financing for renovation. Some of the informants did also perceive the relative opposition to energy efficiency by other interest groups also to be pronounced, whereas some informants were convinced that especially Eurelectric and its member federations were lobbying the national governments hard to weaken the legislation, as well as Businesseurope. As such, there was a strong bias for the status quo to prevail. This is in line with Mahoney's findings (2008) where coalitions are more likely to emerge when the constellations of adversaries are apparent. About the policy context in which the interest groups operated in, one of the informants stated:

"(…) everybody likes it and everybody is for it [energy efficiency], and then it comes to real action, suddenly and partially due to the sovereign debt crisis which came just in then, the response was `yeah, we would like do to it, but unfortunately we have no money` (…)".

As this quote indicate, especially sources of finance are central to energy efficiency investments. This is one of the most difficult topics to solve as in order to solve the market failure of energy efficiency, high up-front costs are needed. The technical nature of energy efficiency and the scattered competence on important topics such as finance lead to the necessity of cooperation. However, policy details like discussing how to deliver energy savings was important, but in order to establish the coalition, determining the goal was also central. The goal of the Coalition was to promote 20 percent binding energy efficiency targets and membership was regulated thereafter. Interest groups could therefore coalesce around a target which matched their individual preferences. Admittance to the Coalition was regulated according to binding 20 percent targets and thereby also a marker of ambition to which groups could sign up to (Interview CAN-E), and agree on not to oppose the work of the Coalition for Energy Savings in independent advocacy efforts (Interview Matthieu Ballu). The promotion of binding energy efficiency targets as a unifying goal fits with the theory and evidence from Hula (1999: 30 – 32). It shows also that it is easier to build a common advocacy position when the current status quo opposition is strong and those interest groups

that opposite can take a proactive stance. According to one informant, facilitating agreement on energy efficiency in the formative phase was not difficult because:

"Europe was doing so badly on energy efficiency that everybody in industry just wanted more of it to happen, and they were more than happy to sign up to a binding target, because it's the sort of thing that would make the difference".

5.3.2 Intra-Group Coherence

As stated in theory, for a coalition to function a formal structure is needed to overcome the initial problem of transaction costs and facilitate information sharing. A formal decision making structure with a policy brokers, as well as the facilitation of benefits should give interest groups incentives to remain inside. During the pre-legislative stage of the EED, the Coalition for Energy Savings largely worked as an ad-hoc coalition before becoming established in autumn 2011. Facilitating agreement inside this advocacy group that could resemble the features of an ad-hoc coalition was reported rather unproblematic. Within this informal advocacy group there was also a secretariat that would monitor policy developments, facilitate information exchange, prepare communication work and outreach to decision-makers. Another shared feature of the ad-hoc coalition is thought to be with like-minded interest groups (Mahoney 2008: 167). The Coalition for Energy Savings display features as such where some of the members had complimentary objectives in the short term, but more uncertain long terms interests. For instance, is the promotion of CHP technology which is a technology to accommodate fossil fuel represented by COGEN Europe, is inconsistent with the long term targets of the environmental NGOs to reduce climate gas emissions. Other member organizations have also been reported to have been adversaries on other policy issues such as the ETS, as well as one the role of energy efficiency in domestic appliances. This indicates that the shared ground for cooperation is similar concerns over the status of energy efficiency. The 20 percent target was therefore the appeal to join the Coalition, which did most on the work of general advocacy and communication about the need for 20 percent binding targets. Interest groups could therefore also lobby independently on the topics that were most salient to them as the members did their own advocate efforts individually, but it didn't contradict the joint position. The less formalized stance of the Coalition for Energy Savings contributed to that, as uniting on the common needs for binding energy efficiency targets was not difficult compared to later. This is in accordance with Hulas observations (1999: 30 – 32).

"(…) when it comes to the proposition of the EED, in some ways it came to relatively easy, it wasn't too hard to get agreement (...). What has actually been more challenging getting an agreement, has been now the sort of attention to implementation of the EED, but also to the question of targets for 2030".

However building trust was deemed to be essential for the cooperation to work further. All informants reported to have done a high level off efforts inside the coalition to make sure that their position was reflected. Since meetings where done fairly regularly from once or twice a week (Interview Matthieu Ballu; Interview WWF-EPO), it can indicate that cohesion was high. All involved groups reported to have done a high share of efforts inside the Coalition for Energy Savings in the beginning phase, from 2010 till the formal establishment of the Coalition in autumn 2011. Although cooperation started in 2009 with producing the "Energy Savings 2020" report, little policy research was undertaken after that. Instead informants would underline the high degree of information sharing. Such information sharing could improve the groups' ability to better monitor policy developments. According to one informant, the information that everyone could bring to the Coalition also made it more attractive to cooperate:

"So they met regularly, every other week there with all issues, political issues, prepare the communication work. Exchange of information, rumors, leaked documents etc. It was an extremely open discussion there, completely informal".

Establishing a structure that enables provision of selective benefits such as information exchange, prepare communication and coordinate efforts can thus contribute to intra-group coherence.

5.3.3 The Coalition for Energy Savings – What Kind of Actor?

In the context of coalition formation within the EU, the Coalition for Energy Savings seems to be an unusual type of organization, from starting as an ad-hoc coalition to evolve as something more formalized. This section will attempt to explore what kind of collective action the Coalition for Energy Savings constitutes. Different types of more developed coalition models will be contrasted and seen in the light of previous discussions about interest groups mobilization. Finally, the role of Coalition for Energy savings will be discussed according to the needs of policy makers towards the Commission.

Even though the work inside the Coalition for Energy Savings displays other similar features of ad-hoc coalitions, it nevertheless violates definition of ad-hoc coalition due to the formal organizational structure and regulated membership as cooperation evolved (Heclo 1978; Hula 1999; Mahoney 2008: 168). Another feature of ad-hoc coalitions is that the members are expected to mobilize for only on single issue (Mahoney 2007a: 377), and one could thereby expect them to dissolve when the issue is over. An ad-hoc coalition could still be working on a topic for the medium term (as the Directive has turned to the implementation phase), but overall the Coalition has become more elaborated with new members having joined underway (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). The stability of the coalition is therefore striking, in a period where policy networks and alliances in Europe are thought to be "less stable and more issue specific" (Richardson 2000: 1008). Other models of interest groups coalitional behavior does not fully describe the cooperation in this case either. Warleigh (2000: 239 – 240) set forts a policy coalition model for cooperation between interest groups based on mutual interests over a policy issue, although the different features are not presented in-depth. This approach can be more fertile as it does not make assumptions about an organization structure for a coalition to form. Instead, motivation to form coalition is done by a "pragmatic search for advantage" (Warleigh 2000: 240). Warleigh contrasts this with the more developed Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by Sabatier, which refers to stable networks of advocates who perceive the policy issue similarly, grounded in common values and beliefs (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2007). It follows from the assumptions about interest groups' behavior, that a coalition not based on common beliefs cannot be labeled an advocacy coalition per se (Szarka 2010: 839). The ACF is hardly feasible to test in this case due to the large number of informants such a theory demands, as well as it takes the whole policy subsystem as the unit of analysis with a scope of long term policy change (Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2007: 220). Giving primacy to policy beliefs over policy interests might be overblown when studying under which conditions a coalition has been established, as Warleigh (2000: 238) notes: "there is no need for a common *Weltanschauung*, just complementary objectives". Hence, the reason for joining a coalition is thought to be marginal advantage of cooperation instead of shared beliefs or values (Warleigh 2000: 240).

But Warleighs model of policy coalition (2000: 240) does omit one important aspect of the Coalition for Energy Savings, which is the horizontal form of integration (i.e. flat and non-hierarchical relationships) between the interest groups (Pijneburg 1998: 305 – 306). The Euro-federation model is an example of a type of horizontal integration as it is established like an overarching type of umbrella organization (Pijneburg 1998: 305). The description of the Coalition for Energy Savings as set forth in the study could therefore display features of a Euro-federation as such. The consensual way of decision making inside the Coalition for Energy Savings makes the aggregation of a policy position resemble what Bouwen labels EEI (2002). Disputes could therefore be more easily solved when there was a shared committee to oversee the advocacy process and being under the organization of a policy broker when there was disagreement. It is therefore probable that the Coalition for Energy Savings transformed form an ad-hoc coalition till becoming a Euro-federation later. In that respect, one of the informants stated:

"I think it must have been in September 2011 when the Coalition really started working as a European association, although it didn't have the legal status as a European association."

However, one nuance ought to be made considering the comparison with the Euro-federation model, as there is an underlying logic of collective action. Hula conceives that coalition formation between organizations to some extent represent the collective action between firms or individuals, although there are important differences as interest groups are already mobilized organizations (1999: 23 – 25). For interest groups that join a coalition, having the possibility to shape the policy is connected with membership to coalition formation. The decision to join a coalition can also be motivated with what can be seen as negative incentives for firms to join Euro-federation, namely that European decision-makers will not take will take the view of the relevant coalition as the view for the interest groups sector as a whole (McLaughlin and Jordan 1993: 155; Richardson 1996: 204).However, this point should not be exaggerated as Euro-federations often represents as sector in their own. According to Hula (1999: 26 – 30), another motivational factors behind an interest group decision to join a coalition is due to the institutional background in which the interest group operate. This institutional background for the interest groups to mobilize at the EU level will be presented in the next chapter.

A coalition as a broader constituency of support?

As outlined above, the working mode of the Coalition for Energy Savings could resemble the structure of a Euro-federation, with a flat and consensual decision making procedure. As stated in the causes for establishing the coalition, there was comparatively little "push" for energy efficiency by interest groups compared to for instance renewables. When competencies are dispersed and stakeholders are scattered, establishing a cross-sectorial platform can be an appropriate medium to develop such support. Since the Coalition was also the only organization that was able to present a position on all the different aspects of the EED (Interview Matthieu Ballu), it also eases the burden for decision makers when considering whether they have enough support for a proposal. Interest groups that can present provide information and support, becoming what has been called a "one-stop shop", is deemed to be favorable when dealing with the Commission. Earlier case studies have recognized that due to the high need for information and scarce resources by officials, the Commission prefers not to encounter interests that are divided or contradictory (Knill 2001: 240). Also in the American context, coalitions are understood to be effective as an interest group strategy, by helping legislators to avoid having to take difficult decisions (Hula 1999: 28). For decision makers that have to confront disunited interests, this also entails making difficult choices when compromises are not agreed upon in advance. Interest groups can therefore be encouraged to agree on a position joint first. It has also been acknowledged that legislators have an interest in establishing long term relationships with different interest groups (Loomis 2002: 188; Gullberg 2008b:162).

Cooperation between interest groups to form a larger platform was reported to have been desirable between several proponents of the EP and the Commission side (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). From this aspect, the Coalition is also a response to the needs of policy making in the European Union, to have an overarching and comprehensive voice for energy efficiency cross-sectorally (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). This parallels earlier debates about the interest groups relationship with decision makers, where a supranational actor such as the Commission can play a strategic role by mobilizing what has been called "a constituency of support" (Richardson 1996: 204; Burns and Carson 2011: 146). It has been recognized that every DG in the Commission prefers to have actors that can support its proposals and display where the "bulk of support lies" on a given issue (Chalmers 2013b: 15

– 16; Mahoney 2007a: 368). Also, the work within the Coalition for Energy Savings was significant in that sense that it provided the Commission with the relevant policy information it needed and the legitimacy from both business actors and member based organizations. In terms of provided information from the Coalition for Energy Savings, the Coalition did also met with Commission frequently and exchanged information often (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Also, since members of the Coalition for Energy Savings would usually present themselves as members of the Coalition, the aggregated contact of the Coalition for Energy Savings to the Commission was high (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Deepened cooperation between the Commission with market actors and civil society can thus be used to "reinforce" the Commissions position versus the Council and member states (Coen 1997: 104). This is underscored in earlier studies between the Commission and other networks of interest groups, where a cross-sectoral platform can provide more "clout" in policy making (Eikeland 2011).

The long term scope of power relations between European institutions is not the scope of this study, but promoting interest groups to form coalitions can be in order to achieve one of the Commission goals, namely increased European integration (Burns and Carson 2011: 146). When there is high opposition from member states on an issue, such behavior can be encouraged by supranational actors. As seen, in figure 3, the EU has taken a patchwork approach to its energy efficiency policies. This study has shown how the constellation of interest groups within the energy efficiency policy subsystem has changed. Such a change in interest groups constellation can however be necessary for the Commission to propose stronger measures when the progress towards the 2020 energy efficiency target is due to be revised in 2016 (Commission 2012). After all, energy efficiency is a relatively new policy domain for environmental NGOs to be brought up in a coordinated way by interest groups. Since the Commission is considered to be the most supranational institution in the EU and motivated towards advancing deeper integration and thereby enhance its own position, (Bouwen 2004: 346), the Coalition for Energy Savings can thus provide the needed support for supranational in a policy area where the member states preferences have been shown to be reluctant. This also has to do with the policy area of energy efficiency requiring a stable political framework, due to the high up-front costs and long payback rates of energy efficiency investments. For companies that seek to invest in energy efficiency, a steady flow

of projects is also needed for investments to be worthwhile (Interview EuroACE)[19]. Renovation of public buildings could be such an immediate trigger in order to create a market demand for energy efficiency projects first, in which companies would decide to invest in energy efficiency service delivery. Since such projects also require high up-front costs, stable framework conditions for energy efficiency are central for businesses that consider investing in building renovation. Developing long term strategies for energy efficiency seemed to be central for interest groups to continue their cooperation. Informants also perceived the cooperation within the Coalition for Energy Savings to be long term, in order to secure their goals with promoting longer term targets towards the 2030 goals for energy efficiency.

5.4 Amendments in the EED Compared to the Final Proposal

Some of the articles and provisions in the EED were substantially amended during the ensuing negotiation phase after the Commission's proposal. The main addition was various opt-out clauses related to the implementation of various policy instruments. Member states were also given some flexibility regarding how measurements are counted. One of the most central opt-outs in the scheme regards the renovation of public buildings by the member states, which was cut to occupied building at the central government level in the final directive[20] (Commission 2012). In addition, member states could opt for other policy measures as an alternative to establishing an EEO-framework. One exemption for the member states is to ensure that energy companies contribute to national energy efficiency funds that the state can contribute to, equaling the cost of undertaking energy efficiency installations (Commission 2012; EED guidebook 2013c). Also, the final directive versions open up the possibility for so called "early action" measures within the EEO framework, which in practice translates that earlier efforts taken to save energy can be counted as savings under the EED if they are implemented before 2014 (Commission 2012: 15 – 17). On top of this opt-out of early actions accounting, there is another 25 percent exemption amount which members that already have energy efficiency obligations in place can credit (Blogactiv 2012; Commission

[19] This is especially related to building companies, energy suppliers that invest in services directly and for ESCOs, which have to invest in training of staff in order to go in for energy efficiency projects.

[20] This reduction is significant, as buildings occupied by the central governments constitutes a small segment of the whole public building stock. For instance, it hardly applies to some member countries with limited amount centrally possessed buildings, such as federal Germany.

2012: 15 – 17). Member states can also get more flexibility towards how the 1.5 percent quantities are phased in, through differentiation for different years (Commission 2012: 15 – 17). Regarding the binding energy efficiency targets and Energy Supplier Obligations, the little political will from member states for political integration in the field of energy efficiency for such measures is a major reason why the framework was not stronger.

Although EEO schemes were a first priority for the Coalition for Energy Savings together with promoting the 20 percent binding target, there was also one important article added to the directive, which according to the informants were due to their intensive lobbying efforts towards the EP. This concerns article 4 especially (that changed from article 3a in the Commission proposal), which enforces member states to draw up long term renovation road maps for the energy efficiency performance of the building stock and roadmaps for implementing these policies. This article is also the only measure in the EED that has a time horizon beyond the year 2020 (Interview EuroACE). This entails that member states have to draw up strategies for the renovation of the existing building stock which will be revised every three year (Commission 2012; EED Guidebook 2013b). This was satisfying for those interest groups with a material interest from the building sector. It is also a necessary approach since energy efficiency installations are demanding in terms of investments and staff training and therefore requires a long term strategy to attain upgrades (Commission 2011a: 7).

5.5 Summary of Findings

The study has put forth two theories. The first model of resource exchange of information between the Commission and interest groups seem to capture the relationship between decision makers and lobbyists in a satisfactory manner. The Commission was by all interest groups perceived to need mainly technical information, and EEI over DEI again. Most of the technical information supplied to the Commission also took the form of being what Chalmers (2013a) calls feasibility information, namely to demonstrated how the 20 percent energy efficiency target could be met. Providing technical information would give an interest group increased access to the Commission. Interest groups from the building sector were the central knowledge providers in this regard, in cooperation with different research institutes. For interest groups it was important to anticipate what information that would be needed. Those

interest groups that that could gather technical information from members and through other networks achieved higher access to the Commission. For those actors the EED was most salient for, interest groups from the building sector preferred to cooperate with research institutes and consultants to produce information, while Eurelectric would mainly draw on their members' expertise. Environmental NGOs would not concentrate on supplying information to the Commission directly, but work along other actors to coordinate policy communication. Also, interest groups with a clearer profile for information production could also achieve a higher repertory to provide the information to decision makers. Organizing conferences or workshops seems to be a preferred option, and would thereby open another access channel to the Commission. Also, for interest groups that possessed technical information or relevant expertise also made it more probable that the Commission will contact an interest group for information directly. Those interest groups that possessed technical information could also increase their leverage on how to supply it. The benefits of being a knowledge provider are thus multiple, compared to the supply of access goods by organizations that would mainly concentrate on policy messages. Also groups with members directly in touch with the building market (EuroAce, Eurima) did to a high degree coordinate their advocacy activity together with other organized interests participated in "outside" strategies such as the Renovate Europe campaign. This shows that being an "insider" does not necessarily exclude a group from using an outside tactic. Together, this adds up that EK is the key resource to the Commission when the lobby channel is overcrowded (Gullberg 2011). The importance of being a knowledge provider in order to gain access is further underscored by findings from other domains in EU climate and energy politics. Both in the case of the revision of the ETS and ownership unbundling of electric utilities, interest groups that could provide demanded information about the relevant policy design were central policy interlocutors to the supranational institutions (Wettestad 2009; Eikeland 2008; Eikeland 2011). This could indicate that interests groups representing the building sector have gained a standing of providing reliable information about the European policy dimension (Coen 2007: 338 – 339).

Despite the low occurrence of coalitions between interest groups to emerge at the EU level (Mahoney 2008), findings from this study indicates that pursuing a coalition strategy might be a preferred way for interest groups to work, but most plausibly under certain conditions. This

study has shown that the main factors contributing to interest groups decision to forge a coalition are organizational characteristics such as earlier collaborative experience and issue context factors related to the policy area. The study is thus is accordance with earlier findings (Hojnacki 1997; Mahoney 2008), where both these factors co-vary in order to explain why some interest groups form coalitions. Understanding Euro-federations collaborative behavior in terms of linkages to other interest groups is central when they are lobbying on a contested issue. Especially when there the stakeholders are come from "niche" groups, are scattered in terms of competencies and the political content is complex, the study shows that formal coalition building can be a preferred strategy for interest groups. This complements Mahoney (2007a; 2008) findings, whereas she considers that those organizations with encompassing memberships are less prone to join coalitions, whereas in the case of Coalition for Energy Savings, most of the members belonged to a "niche" domain.

Altogether, the findings in this study show that earlier criticism of the Euro-federation as for being "weak", "ineffective" and a "paper tiger" (Pijneburg 1998: 303 – 305), ought to be nuanced. Euro-federations, when they are well networked, are very well able to close the information gap for decision-makers, as well as to build a formal coalition to enhance their policy claim. Instead of being only a single "fora" for their members (Eising 2009: 184), this study indicates that Euro-federations can gain considerable autonomy in terms of developing advocacy strategies by building positions with other groups. However, the study also shows that interest groups can have a high level of access, but also still have moderate impact upon policy proposals (Bouwen 2002: Dür and de Bievre 2007a), as the Commission's proposal did not contain any prescription of binding energy efficiency targets, although most of the Coalition for Energy Savings members achieved their goals in terms of policy instruments.

5.6 Evaluation of Theory and further Theoretical Propositions

The approach set forth by Chalmers where interest groups capacity to meet the informational demand is understood as their capabilities to monitor policy developments and produce policy research material (2011; 2013a), seems justified. However, this study shows that most interest groups would usually cooperate with third parties to produce technical information, apart for

those few organizations that could mobilize relevant competence among their members. The cooperation to produce technical information mostly remained with actors that had established a relevant competence in the area. Being connected in a homogenous and heterogeneous network was an advantage for interest groups to share information, which could better monitor policy developments and identify needs for relevant information (Chalmers 2013a). This indicates that network strategies matter most to increase representativeness and to obtain advantages through shared information, rather than to technical information jointly. With regard to the Coalition for Energy Savings, this seems plausible, as after the joint venture of producing the "Energy Savings 2020" report, sharing information and position building was more relevant than producing new policy research. However, the Coalition for Energy Savings would supply the Commission early with information about how to meet the overall energy efficiency target of 20 percent, wherein the policy preferences of the member where aggregated. As such, a coalition can be an effective medium for interest groups to supply their aggregated policy recommendations as it amplifies the policy claim and thereby resembles EEI, but those groups concerned about supplying relevant policy research material would pursue such strategies independently.

One nuance is however ought to be made with regard to the supply of access goods by the different Euro-federations. Bouwen recognizes that "a slow decision-making structure inside a European association can hamper the efficient provision of access goods" (Bouwen 2004: 344). Different decision-making structures could be identified across the interest groups in the study. As seen in this case, some of the larger federations with predominantly national associations as members (Orgalime, FIEC) were slow or not able to aggregate a strong position. It could be a tendency that those organizations which display features of majoritarian decision making structure are faster to aggregate a position, than those who display consensual features. A majoritarian decision making structure implies how positions are determined according to a certain size of the interest groups members or simply majority voting. A consensual decision making structure refers to almost anonymous decisions with only minor deviations. Klüver (2012) investigates how a different organizational characteristic in terms of resources, staff and member base impacts the supply of information from interest groups. But neither resources nor staff has in this study been shown to be the major determinants upon groups informational output. It might therefore be that groups that

have demonstrated a consensual mode of organization are slower to react to informational demands by European institutions. Linking Euro-federations decision making structure to the informational supply can thus nuance how fast interest groups are able to supply access goods. One of the informants expressed it as follows:

"More and more associations tend to have direct company membership, which means they got much stronger boards (…). All the associations, the more likely it is to have (…) unanimity or consensus. And that defines the character of what you can do".

The study has attempted to identify under which circumstances Euro-federations decide to form coalitions. Although Euro-federations are thought to be generally less inclined than American interest groups to form coalitions (Mahoney 2007a; Mahoney 2008), the causes behind forming the Coalition for Energy Savings seem the same as for US interest groups, which could indicate that lobbying at the EU level is not something *sui generis* (Woll 2006). Findings from the study seem to discern that previous collaboration behavior of interest groups and the nature of a policy issue matters for a coalition to emerge. Interest groups that are used to work in alignment are often more prone to form coalitions. Increased interest group cooperation could therefore be expected when relevant groups are already familiar with position building and embedded in a homogenous network first. This could perhaps ease the transition when forming a coalition, as seen in this case where both NGOs ("Green 10") and building industry (EEIF) would already be accommodated to make positions that don't contradict each other first. The integration of homogenous networks into a heterogeneous network can be such a causal mechanism (George and Bennett 2005: 111) from which the Coalition for Energy Savings emerged. A further theoretical development could thus be to first identify to which different "cluster" interest groups usually belong to first when discerning ad-hoc coalitions. Also, informants in this study reported that coalition behavior was a regular part of their advocacy efforts. One representative that was not a member of the Coalition for Energy Savings thus stated the following:

"(…) the moment you get a coalition it is much easier to talk, because you are presenting a pre-consensus, you are politically an easy prospect. Increasingly, there are ad-hoc coalitions on issues. And increasingly, you have to be several associations together."

As the quote indicates, building ad-hoc coalitions at the EU level might occur more frequently than expected. This could be enhanced when the policy subject is contested and the

competencies are scattered, such as in the energy efficiency domain, where the call for binding 20 percent energy efficiency target between interest groups was done cross-sectorally. Interest groups could thus be susceptible to form the more complex and encompassing issues that are brought up to the EU level. As such, it could be easier to identify in which policy domains coalition building is more likely to occur through mapping the relevant background factors and organizational characteristics in advance. In the US context, Hula considers the increasing coalitional behavior by interest groups to be caused increasing specialization and a general proliferation of the interest group population towards narrower domains (1999:6). In the EU context, the European interest group population grew rapidly after the Maastricht Treaty and establishment of the single market although it has stagnated in recent years (Greenwood 2011: 9 – 11). If the interest group landscape in the EU will increase and resemble the US interest group population, coalition building might well become a preferred advocacy strategy.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Concluding Remarks

The study attempts to answer two research questions. A short suggestion for further research is also made in the answer of research question two.

1. What kind of "access goods" did the European associations supply to the Commission before the EED proposal, and what strategies did they employ to do so?

As a technical and bureaucratic body, the Commission was perceived by the interest groups to mainly be in demand for technical information under the pre-legislative phase of the EED. The Euro-federations related to the building industry were early in supplying such information by cooperating with research institutes and consultancies. They were also the groups that got highest access to the Commission. This confirms earlier findings, namely that expert knowledge is a key resource to achieve access, when channel is overcrowded such as towards the Commission (Gullberg 2011). Those groups, who could not produce technical information to get access to the Commission, supplied political information about the policy interest of their members (EEI). Environmental NGOs did not approach the EED towards production of access goods as such, but instead largely concentrate on advocacy work with other actors. The strategies used by Euro-federations to supply the Commission were mostly insider strategies. Findings suggest that employing "insider" and "outsider" strategy simultaneously is not mutually exclusive, as groups can align with others, either through campaigns or networks, to make "voice" around an issue. Some groups would align in broader networks and a coalition in order to amplify their policy messages. Possessing access gods such as technical information also gives more leverage how to transmit it. Providing technical information through events such as workshops seems to be a favorable strategy for delivering information. However, in order to better anticipate the need for information, being connected in a network and coalition seems favorable for groups in order to identify what types of information that eventually would be needed.

2. Why did some of the Euro-federations establish a coalition to promote energy efficiency, and how did they aggregate a joint advocacy position among them?

The relative lack of "push" in the energy efficiency sector compared to for instance the concentrated interest bases of renewable energy producers was an important factor by environmental NGOs to identify the need for increasing interest group collaboration. Earlier successful cooperation over the research report "Energy Savings 2020" between different stakeholders and interest groups caused further collaboration and was developed to a larger cross-sectorial platform called the Coalition for Energy Savings. A mutual concern over the status of energy efficiency towards the 20 percent target was deemed central to the cooperation. The earlier habit of coordinating positions between the interest groups in their own networks was of importance. However, the issue context in which the interest groups decided to form a coalition is pivotal. Due to the scattered stakeholders and competencies across the energy efficiency policy domain, coalition building became an important advocacy strategy in order to mobilize for stronger legislation, as well as the relative opposition towards stronger energy efficiency legislation by other actors and member states. A cross-sectorial coalition that can promote European integration is also likely to be favored by a supranational body like the Commission, which can provide it with information and support behind proposals. The aggregation of a position inside the Coalition for Energy Savings largely resembles the way a position is aggregated in a Euro-federation, with a flat structure and a consensual mode of decision. Having established a more formalized structure helped to increase accountability by the members, as well as facilitating information sharing. Also the trust building underway mattered for stronger ties to develop till the Coalition for Energy Savings became formalized later.

The problems related to describing the cooperation that occurred with the Coalition for Energy Savings concerns the degree of formalization and establishing membership rule. As seen in the process towards the formal adoption of the Coalition for Energy Savings, successful cooperation in an ad-hoc alliance might lead to further joint activities. Warleigh (2000) points out the fact that an ad-hoc coalition might very well evolve in an advocacy coalition over time. Further research could consider employing the Advocacy Coalition

Framework by Sabatier (1998), to study the Coalition for Energy Savings if the cooperation remains intact. This is in line with Warleighs suggestions, namely to supervise a coalition after the conclusion of the legal proposal it was meant to advocate (2000: 240). This should be done in order to better determine if the choice of collaboration partners was due to issue specific causes or shared beliefs and follow up with studying the energy efficiency subsystem over time. The Advocacy Coalition Framework is said to offer a number of advantages in its application on EU policy processes, since coalitions that are composed of NGOs, businesses organization, research institutes or government officials can often be identified (Sabatier 1998: 121). Also, the Advocacy Coalition Framework is frequently applied to environmental disputes (Szarka 2010: 838), and should thereby have relevance for the energy efficiency sector. This might prove to be fertile approach for a further study as informants perceived their advocacy efforts for energy efficiency to be long-lasting.

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Appendix I

List of informants

Businesseurope, Mr. Alexandre Affre, Senior Advisor, Industrial Affairs.

CAN-Europe, Ms. Erica Hope, NGO Coordinator, now in ECF.

Coalition for Energy Savings, Mr. Stefan Scheuer, Secretary General.

Eurelectric, Ms. Jesse Scott, Head of Unit, Environment and Sustainable Development Policy.

Eurima, Mr. Andoni Hidalgo, Public Affairs and Communications Manager.

EuroACE, Mr. Adrian Joyce, Secretary General and Renovate Europe Campaign Director.

FIEC, Mr. Frank Faraday, Director of Technical Affairs (resigned 10th of June).

Mr. Matthieu Ballu, former employee in the secretariat of Coalition for Energy Savings, now DG Mare.

Orgalime, Ms. Anne-Claire Rasselet, Advisor in Environment Team.

WWF-EPO, Ms. Arianna Vitali Roscini, Policy Officer for Energy Conservation.

Appendix II

Interview guide about the Energy Efficiency Directive.

Name Organization

Interview Opening

- Thank for setting aside time to conduct the interview.
- Ask if OK to be cited in name in the final study.
- Start with some grand tour questions, general activity in the interest group, how is a day at the office.
- Ask the representative what it is their impression of the EED policy process.

1. **Questions about the general stance of the interest group.**

The Interest group stance on binding energy efficiency targets.	
Would you prefer a stricter regulatory framework than the directive outcome? (Also in terms of technical details; primary final energy, audits, measurement)	
Interest group view of the introduced Energy Efficiency Obligations as an appropriate policy instrument.	

Who, in your opinion, should bear the cost of undertaking energy audits?	
Potential consequences of the regulation for your interest constituency.	

2. Mapping the access to the Commission before the proposal in June 2011.

Degree	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
What type of contact did the [interest group] have with the Commission? (Face-to-face meetings, email correspondence, phone calls, write letters, et.c.)					
How difficult was it for the [interest group] to get Commission access? (1,easy – 5 hardest)					
To what level did the [interest group] get access? Commissioner (1), commission cabinet, senior official, policy officer, desk officer (5). **Probe: level importance.**					

How often did they discuss policy with the Commission in average? (**Probe on intensity)** (1,Seldom, once a month, twice month, weekly basis, 5 two times a week or more)					
Did the Commission actively request any type of information from [interest group]? (1 didn't occur – 5 Commission sought info.)					
Can the [interest group] name one or more Commission officials with whom they had contact with during the proposal stage? (Name, email).					
Was it a difference in access for the [interest group] before and after the Energy Action Plan, launched in March 2011?					

3. Demand side questions for Commission and interest group.

What kind of expert information did the Commission need from the [interest group]? (technical analysis, impact assessments, legal information, feasibility information)	

What type of political salient information was the Commission in need of? (general opinion about the European interest or different member states positions)					
What kind of these information types was most important to the Commission? Expert knowledge or European salient information.					
Was it more salient to provide relevant information before or after the Energy Efficiency action plan in March 2011?					
Degree	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Did the Commission rely on information from the [interest group] over a protracted amount of time? (1 to 5, little to high degree of dependency)					
To which degree does the [interest group] perceive themselves to be the sole provider of their information resources? (1, little degree- 5, high)					

4. **Interest groups ability to supply information.**

Did the [interest group] undertake in-house technical research with the aim to supply the Commission with information?	
Did the [interest group] request technical analysis from their member organizations in order to supply the Commission with relevant analysis?	
Could the [interest group] please describe their general activities of analysis within the field of Energy Efficiency? (**Probe** Internal capacity for conducting research, staff and resources)	
Was the interest group ever contacted directly by the Commission for policy relevant information?	

If yes on the above questions: please answer the following two questions.

Degree	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
How fast could the [interest group] react to the Commission's request? (Response time: day after, following week, next week, same month, later).					
Did the [interest group] supply information to the Commission more frequently, rather than one-off basis? (quality versus quantity).					

5. Types of involvement during the Directive run-up phase

Degree	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Did the [interest group] coordinate their activities with other interest groups to influence the EED? (1, no coordination – 5, high degree)					
Did the interest group have much contact with other interest organizations to produce policy relevant information? (1,low degree – 5, high degree).					
What approach did the [interest group] apply to achieve access to the Commission (face-to-face meetings, phone calls, email correspondence, launch events, participate in campaigns).					
Did the [interest group] attach importance to be a part of a network during the run-up phase of the proposal? (yes/no – participate in a group which shared view)					
Did the [interest group] have a constant position on the EED? (Change after Commission contact or discussion with other stakeholders)					

6. **Those involved in the Coalition for Energy Savings.**

Degree	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
Regulation of membership: how is it regulated? (1, little openness – 5, high)					
Please explain how was the Coalition for Energy Savings formed? Describe the start up-phase. How was position aggregated?					
(Who was first mover/initiator/leader?) Fragmented or concentration of power in the network?					
Driver behind network: energy efficiency targets, policy instruments, financing? What policy instrument did they promote? Motivation: interest or ideas?					
Please describe interaction: before EED proposal. Did some interests dominate? bargaining/conflict/cooperation					
Explain their role and how long worked in the coalition/ how was coordinating NGOs/business interests?					

Interview Close

- Ask the persons if he or she has any questions and provide responses
- Ask if they would like to add something
- Thank the representative for his or her participation.